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I. INTRODUCTION: THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
COLORADO RIVER
The American Southwest has been called "the greatest hydraulic society
ever built in history."' At its geological, economic, and political epicenter lies
the 1450-mile-long Colorado River ("Colorado River" or "River"), which provides water to nearly forty million people, irrigates five and a half million acres
of land, and flows through dozens of large hydropower and storage dams.' Its
waters also support significant portions of nine US and Mexican states, twentytwo federally-recognized Indian tribes, seven National Wildlife Refuges, four
National Recreation Areas, eleven US National Parks, and an internationally
recognized Biosphere Reserve in Mexico.' Areas supported by tie River's waters produce nearly nineteen percent of US gross domestic product;' some fifteen percent of US crop production and thirteen percent of US livestock production also originates in this region.'
The River has also been aptly described as "the most legislated, most debated, mad most litigated river in the entire world,"' supporting a voluminous set
of treaties, interstate compacts, laws, regulations, court decisions and decrees,
agreements, and contracts that collectively are kno n to its managers and practitioners as the "Law of the River." For better and for worse, the unprecedented
development of the Colorado River paved the way for subsequent federal projects, such as Grand Coulee Dam, Bonneville Dam, and the Tennessee Valley
Project on rivers across the United States, and was a model for other international river basin development. The River's Hoover Dam, which retains Lake
Mead outside of Las Vegas, Nevada, was the very first of an estimated forty-five
thousand large danms (over fifteen meters in height or approximately five stories)
now in operation worldwide.'
In addition to providing the engineering blueprints for large dams and other
major public water infrastructure worldwide, international and domestic tensions over water sharing in the Colorado River Basin ("Colorado River Basin"
or "River Basin" or "Basin") and the greater American West have shaped and

1. STEPIIEN C. MCCAFFREY, [HE LA\v OF INTERNATIONAl WATERCOURSES 13 (2nd ed.
2007); DONALD VORSTER, RIVERS OF EMIIRE: VATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GRowri-I OF THE

AMERICAN WEST 276 (1985).
2. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER BASIN
WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY 3 (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter COLORADO RIVER BASIN
WATER SUPPLY1, ai'aila)leathttp://w'.v.usl)r.go\/lc/region/pr6granms/crbstudy/finalrepor/Exec-

utive%20Summaiy/CRBSExecutive-SunmmaryFINAL.pdf,

see also The Colorado Rivei;

NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, http://enironment.nafionalgeographic.com/environnient/fresh
water/change-the-course/colorado-river-malp/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
3. COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY, sup;a note 2, at 3.
4. Andrew Maddocks & Paul Reid, 4orld's 18 Aost Water-Stressed Riveis, VORLD RES.
INST. (Mar. 20, 2014), http://u-v.wri.org/blog/2014/03/world%E2%80%99s- 18-most water-stressed-rivers.
5. Agriculture, COLO. RIVER WATER USERS ASS'N, http://wwv-.crwua.org/colorado-river/
uses/agriculture (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
6. MARK REISNER, CADILLAc DESERT: THE AMERICAN W\EST AND rrs DISAPPEARING
\VATER 120 (rev. ed., Penguin Books 1993) (1986); see also McCAFFREY, supra note 1, at 13.
7. MCCAFFREY, suplra note 1, at 13.
8. JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, DEAD POOL: LkKE POWELL, GLOBAL WVARMING, AND THE
Ft _tURE OF WATER INTIIE W¥EST 6 (2008).
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continue to shape many aspects of modern international water law and river
basin development. From the early days of the now-discredited "Harmon Doctrine". to the contemporary principles of "equitable utilization,"" numerous key
principles of international water law arose in the American West as water users,
states, and countries allocated water to facilitate settlement and economic
growth.'
Given its iconic importance, both in the American West and at large, the
River has also been the focus of intense criticism as an exanple of "unsustainable" river development that sets a poor model for other water-scarce regions to
follow." In the words of two scholars, "Itihe tremendous challenge for the
American west [sic], parts of which use far more than the renewable yield [of
water], is to overcome legal, attitudinal, and administrative barriers to effective
water use under conditions of scarcity."" In light of the environmental consequences of the River's development-which has altered more than ninety-eight
percent of the River's natural riparian areas in the Lower Basin, dried out the
River's natural delta, sent four species of native fish into extinction, and driven
nearly half of the remaining native fish in endangered or threatened status"there is no doubt that much of this criticism is well-founded.
Despite its controversial history, the Colorado River also represents a cnitical laboratory for a world facing ever-growing challenges of resource scarcity.
Since the turn of the century, the River and its human managers have been
confronted with a historic drought that rivals anything seen in the last 1,200
9. See McCAFFREY, supra note 1, at 112-13. One of the first theories of international water
law to emerge from the West was that of "absolute territorial sovereignty"-the notion that downstrean users cannot control or dictate how upstream nations use freshwater resources within their
own boundaries. Id. Also known as the "Harmon Doctrine," it was first articulated in 1895 by
US Attorney General Judson Harmon to support the US position that it had no obligation to
consult with Mexico regarding how it chose to utilize the waters of the Rio Grande within US
territory. Id. at 113. This approach, which obviously disproportionately favored upstream states
and greatly compromised downstream users' rights to international waterways, soon fell out of
favor.
10. Equitable utilization is an international principle of water management derived fion the
US principle of equitable apportionment, which originated in United States Supreme Court decisions regarding allocation of interstate water resources. Id. at 384-385. The 1966 Helsinki
Rules adopted equitable utilization as the fundamental norm in international water law-a notion
that was reinforced by the Gab6kovo-Nagymoros Case and the 1997 UN Convention.
ld.
(providing an extensive discussion on the doctrine of equitable utilization); see also Int'l Law
Ass'n, The 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (1967), available at http://wvv.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/meetingsAega-board/20 10/annexesgroundwater paper/Annex IIHelsinkiRulesILA.pdf.
11. The United States Supreme Court announced the doctrine of equitable apportionment
for interstate water allocation in 1906, stating that "equality of right," not equality of amount,
should govern when dividing transboundary rivers amongst states. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 97, 103 (1906) (citations omitted). In later decisions the Court declared that "equality
of right" signifies that states stand on "equal level or plane ... in point of power and right, under
[the US] constitutional system." Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922). Thus, according to this federal common law doctrine, the laws of the individual states do not bind the Court,
and it will balance the equities in order to achieve an equitable apportiomnent.
12. MCCAFFREY, supra note 1, at 14.
13. Malin Falkenmark & Gunnar Lindh, Water and Economic Development,in WATER IN
CRISIS: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S FRESHWATER RESOURCES 80, 87 (Peter H. Gleick ed. 1993).
14. Colorado River Progran:How We Work, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.
nature.org/ouriniatives/regions/nor-thamerica/areas/coloradoriver/hoivevork/index.htm
(last
visitedJune 24, 2014).
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years." At the beginning of the ongoing drought, the Basin's vast reservoir system-capable of storing approximately four years of the Basin's total annual water yield'-stood at full to overflowing." In recent years, storage has been well
below fifty percent of capacity and at the time of this writing it hovers around
half full." Adjacent areas of central and southern California are simultaneously
experiencing extreme drought, which has cut supplies to farms and cities from
the massive Central Valley and State Water Projects to near zero." In the process, this ongoing drought has also provided the Basin's residents with a preview
of what may be a "new normal"-a much drier future for the region that many
climate models and the River's own reconstructed flow history predict."
Facing unprecedented water scarcity, the River's stakeholders" have produced some remarkable examples of collaboration and compromise, including
a 2007 shortage-sharing agreement between the seven US Basin states, 3 a land-

15. See Michael Wines, Colorado RiverDroughtForces a PainfulReckomng for States,N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.n times.com/2014/01/06/us/colorado-river-drought-forces-apainful-reckoning-for-states.html?_r0; see also Sally Deenan, Feds Slash Colorado River Release to Historic Lows, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 16, 2013), http://news.nafionalgeographic.
corn/news/2013/08/130816-colorado-river-drought-lake-powell-mead-water-scarcity/.
16.

See COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY, supra note 2, at 3.

17. Droughtin the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, http://wwv.usbr.gov/uc/feature/drought.html (last updated Aug. 16, 2011); see
POWELL, supra note 8, at 180-81, 183.
18. See Droughtin the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin, supra note 17; see also Colorado River
Basin Water Supply and DemandStudy: Before the Senate Comm. on Energy andNaturalResources,113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Statement ofMichaelL Connori (statement of Michael
L. Connor, Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/testimony/detail.cfmRecordID=2421
(last visited Nov. 22,
2014).
19. Lower Colorado Water Supply Report, River Operations, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR (December 22, 2014), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/
weekly.pdf (on file with author).
20. See Notice to State Water Project Contractors from Carl A. Torgersen, Deputy Dir. of
Cal. Dep't of Water Res. (Apr. 18, 2014), available at http://wwmv.vater.ca.gov/swpao/docs/
notices/14-07.pdf; see also Bettina Boxall, Most Central Valley Growers to get no water from
Central Valley Project, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014) http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/21/science/la-sci-sn-drought-cvp-20140221.
21.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE AND

WATER 105, (June 2008), available at http://vww.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/climate-changewater-en.pdf; see POWELL, supra note 8, at 167-68 (noting that tree ring studies indicated that
the very highest possible average annual flow of the Colorado is 14.6 million acre-feet).
22. There is a broad range of entities involved in the decisions and policymaking surrounding
the Colorado River including US federal agencies such as the US Bureau of Reclamation and the
International Boundary and Water Commission ("IBWC"); Mexican federal agencies such as
the National Water Commission (CONAGUA) and the Comisi6n Internacional de Limites y
Aguas ("CILA"); the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming; various large water utilities and water providers such as the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California ("MVD"), the Central Arizona Water Conservation District
("CAWCD") (operators of the Central Arizona Project), Southern Nevada Water Authority, and
Denver Water; ten Indian tribes; major agricultural districts in the Yuma, Arizona region; California's Imperial Irrigation District, Coachella Valley Water District, and Palo Verde Irrigation
District; Mexico's Irrigation District 14; and various nonprofit organizations such as the Nature
Conservancy, Environmental Defense Fund, Western Resource Advocates, the Pacific Institute,
Trout Unlimited, the Sonoran Institute, and Pronatura Noroeste; among others.
23. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, COLORADO RIVER IN-rERIM
GUIDELINES FOR LOwER BASIN SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATION OF LAKE
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mark stud.y- of future basin-wide supply and demand challenges and the potential impacts of climate change, " and four new international agreements between
the United States and Mexico." As part of this evolution, the River's federal
managers-most notably the US Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") and
the US and Mexican sections of the International Boundary and Water Commission ("IBWC")-have taken a substantial step away from more traditional,
engineering-driven approaches to resource management in favor of more adaptive stakeholder-driven approaches." These processes provide for greater flexibility and broader representation of municipal, agricultural, industrial, recreational, and environmental interests alike."
Among recent innovative approaches, the November 20, 2012, Minute 319
agreement stands out as an important example of cooperation amidst extended
drought and basin-wide deficits.' Minute 319 is an appendage to the 1944
"Treaty Between the United States and Mexico for the Utilization of Water of
the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande" ("1944 Water
Treaty"), which, as relevant here, allocates the flow of the Colorado River between the United States and Mexico.'9 The Minute encompasses a series of
POWELL AND LAKE MEAD 12 (Dec. 2007), [hereinafter 2007 INTERIM SHORTAGE GUIDELINES],

available at http:// "w.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf.
24. COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY, supra note 2, at 3-4.
25. See Int'l Boundary and Water Comm'n [IBWC[, Minute 319: Interim International Cooperative Measures in the Colorado River Basin through 2017 and Extension of Minute 318
Cooperative Measures to Address the Continued Effects of the April 2010 Earthquake in the
Mexicali Valley, Baja California (Nov. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Minute 3191; see also Int'l Boundary
and Water Comm'n [IBWC], Minute 318: Adjustment of Delivery Schedules for Water Allotted
to Mexico for the Years 2010 through 2013 as a Result of Infrastructure Damage in Irrigation
District 014, Rio Colorado, Caused by the April 2010 Earthquake in the Mexicali Valley, Baja
California (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Minute 3181; see also Int'l Boundary and Water Comm'n
[IBWC], Minute 317: Conceptual Framework For U.S.-Mexico Discussions on Colorado River
Cooperative Actions (June 17, 2010) [hereinafter Minute 3171; see alsoInt'l Boundary and Water
Comm'n [IBWC1, Minute 316: Utilization of the Wellton-Mohawk Bypass Drain and Necessary
Infrastructure in the U.S. for the Conveyance of Water by Mexico and Non-Governmental Organizations of Both Countries to the Santa Clara Wetland During the Yuma Desalting Plant Pilot
Run (Apr. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Minute 3161; see also Int'l Boundary and Water Comm'n
[IBWC1, Joint Report of the Principal Engineers Concerning U.S.-Mexico Joint Cooperative Actions Related to the Yuma Desalting Plant (YDP) Pilot Run and the Santa Clara Wetland, Proposed Joint Cooperative Action, (July 17, 2009).
26. See COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY, supra note 2, at 11-15.
27. Reclamation's 2012 Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study provides a
clear example of this change in thinking. The agency's analysis of potential methods to resolve
growing supply and demand imbalances in the Colorado River Basin stands in stark contrast to
its past history as a developer and proponent of large-scale engineering solutions. In the Study,
only twelve of the 150 solutions that Reclamation considered to diminish the supply and demand
gap were traditional proposals invohing major infrastructure and water supply projects. See
COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY, supranote 2, at 11-15. In favor of more cost-effective

solutions, the study focused on various types of conservation, local desalinization, and other "soft
path" alternatives as options to attain needed flexibility in water management. Id. Just as noteworthy, Reclamation's analysis embraced the potential for climate change in the Colorado River
Basin, with the study predicting possible declines in runoff and increases in evaporation. See id
at 7; see also Robert J. Glennon & Peter V. Culp, West Mlfust Strive for Water Sust~dnability,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/
2013/01/02/20130102glennon-culp-west-must-strive-water-sustainabiliy.html?nclickcheck = .
28. See Wines, supma note 15.
29. See Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the
Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 Water Treaty], available at

WA TE? LA IV REVIEW

Volumne 18

agreements, operational measures, and cooperative projects that the United
States and Mexico have agreed to undertake during a five-year period (tie "Pilot
Period") that are intended to become the foundation for a more long-term
agreement, a° including
0

Definitive guidelines for tie reduction of water deliveries to Mexico
during Lower Basin shortage conditions and increased deliveries to
Mexico during surplus conditions;

*

The multi-year storage of Mexico's Colorado River water in the
United States, enabled by rules for conservation, storage, delivery,
and management of salinity impacts;

*

A binational program to financejoint conservation projects, with benefits including exchange of conserved water and environmental flow
commitments;' and

*

The delivery of water to the Colorado River Delta ecosystem, together with expanded environmental restoration efforts."4

These binational commitments also reference and incorporate the direct
cooperation and participation of a series of non-federal government partners in
operational measures and projects that will occur during the Pilot Period, including several major US water providers and US and Mexican non-governmental environmental orgaizations.'
The Minute has tremendous significance for the future of the Colorado
River Delta, which is one of the most water-stressed ecosystems in the world
and a central focus of this article. Jennifer Pitt,"6 who has been at the forefront
of Colorado River issues for more than fifteen years, has often referred to the
Colorado River Delta as the "canary in a coalmine" for the entire Basin-the
first place where environmental problems, along with water shortage, quality,
and management issues, became starkly apparent." In keeping with this theme,
we submit that the story of Minute 319-as an effort to tackle those issues head
on-offers important lessons for international water management at large. It not
only exemplifies innovative approaches to promote operational flexibility, reduce uncertainty, and address ecosystem degradation, but also provides a model

http://ibwc.gov/Files/1944Treaty.pdf.
30. Minute 319, supra note 25, § III.
31. See id.§III(3).
32. See id.
§ I1I(4)-(5).
33. Seeid.§III(6).
34. See id.§ III(7).
35. See id.
§ III(6)(a)-(c).
36. Jennifer Pitt is the Director of the Colorado River Project for the Environmental Defense
Fund. SeeJennifer Pit4 ENvrTL. DEF. FUND, http://wwv.edf.org/people/jennifer-pitt (last visited
Nov. 5, 2014).
37. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Pitt, Dir., Colo. River Project, Envl. Def. Fund (May
3, 2012).
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for fostering cooperation to overcome a long history of conflict, unilateral action, and mistrust.'
According to the World Health Organization, "Imlore than one billion
people around the world now live in water-stressed regions," and that number
is expected to double by 2050." With increasing demand and uncertainties of
climate change straining international freshwater resources, effective models for
the management of water scarcity are badly needed. We contend that Minute 319-and the process used to achieve it-provides a positive blueprint for
cooperative international water management that could inform the efforts of
decision-makers in other international river basins.

II. HISTORY AND WATER USE IN THE COLORADO RiVER DELTA REGION
At its largest extent, the Colorado River Delta ("Colorado River Delta" or
"Delta Region" or "Delta") was one of the world's largest river deltas, originally
spanning 8,611 square kilometers (3,325 square miles) ad extending across the
US-Mexico border. ' The Delta lies within an international region known as the
Salton Trough-a geologic extension of the upper Gulf of California that extends to the northernmost point of California's Coachella Valley, and through
which the last 150 miles of the River flow." Historically, the Delta ecosystem
encompassed the Imperial Valley in southeastern California, the Yuma Valley
in the southwestern comer of Arizona, and Mexico's Mexicali and San Luis
Valleys."2 Today, these areas have been developed predominantly into agricultural land inigated by Colorado River water.2
The Colorado River is essentially the only source of surface water in the
Delta Region." The vast majority of the flow of the Colorado River originates
in the US Upper Basin States (Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico),
38. See David Festa &John Entsminger, A Histoic Course Change on the Colorado Rive,;
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (May 29, 2014), http://,vww,.reviewjounal.co/opinion/historiccourse-change-colorado- river.
39. Sarah Zielinski, The Colorado River Runs Dz , SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 2010),
http://wvw.smithsonianinag.corn/science-nature/The-Colorado-River-Runs-Diy.hml.
40. MICHAEL COHEN & CHRISTINE HENGES-JECK, MISSING WATER: REPORT AND ARTICLE
EXAMINE WATER IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA, PACIFIC INST. 1 (Sep. 2001), available at

http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2013/02/missing-water-fullreport.pdf;

See gen-

erally MARK LELLOUCH ET AL., ECOSYSTEM CHANGES AND WATER POLICY CHOICES: FOUiR
SCENARIOS FOR THE LOWER COLORADO RIVER BASIN TO 2050, at 7-11 (2007), avaiable at

http://wv.sonoraniisftute.org/component/docman/doc-detais/1383-ecosystem-changes-midwater-policy-choices-four-scenarios-for-dhe-lower-colorad-river-basi-t-2050-full-summary09152007.html?Itenid=3.
41.

MICHAEL COHEN, GROUNDWATER DYNAMICS IN THE COLORADO RIVER LIMITROPHE

1-2, 4 (Paula Luu & Nancy Ross eds., 2013), available athttp://pacinst.org/ip-conteIlt/uploads/
2013/05/pacinst-cor-linfiLrophe-report.pdf; see also Salton Trough, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY,
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=81711 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014); see also
wthshots: Satellite Images Of Environmental Change, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://earth-

shots.usgs.gov/earthshots/node/43#ad-inage-0 (last visited Oct.10, 2014).
42.

COHEN& HENGES-JECK; supra note 40; seealsoLELLOUCHETAL. supra note 40, at 21-

22.
43.

SeeJONATHAN WATERMAN, RUNNING DRY: AJOURNEY FROM SOURCE TO SEA DoN

THE COLORADO RIVER 255-59 (2010).
44. See id. at 275; WORSTER, supra note 1, at 273; NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., DIVIDING THE
WATERS: A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

(1966).
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with half of the water resulting from runoff in Colorado and another third from
runoff in Wyoming and Utah.' The US Lower Basin States (California, Arizona, and Nevada) and Mexico contribute very little water to overall surface
flows except for occasional large flood flows out of Arizona's Gila River." Additionally, water users from both countries rely heavily on transnational aquifers, 7 although issues surrounding rights to the use of these aquifers are as yet
largely unresolved both internationally and domestically.
A. THE PRE-DEVELOPMENT DELTA

As early as 1000 BCE, ancestors of the Cocopah Tribe" arrived in the Delta
and established settlements along the River's banks." While few historical records of the Delta's predevelopment state exist, both scientific and literary accounts of the Delta suggest that the Cocopah must have discovered one of the
world's great ecological wonders.' Prior to the twentieth century, the Delta contained one of the world's largest desert estuaries-a vast wetland covering an area
roughly the size of Rhode Island with expansive forests of trees.' Enormous
spring floods inundated much of the Delta Region with water and fresh sediment annually, allowing flora and fauna to flourish." From an ecological perspective, the Colorado River was the most important freshwater inflow into the
upper Gulf of California, supporting major shrimp, shellfish, and finfish fisheries as well as a number of now endangered but once plentiful exotic species,
including the vaquita porpoise and the totoaba bass." A critical link on the
Pacific Flyway, the Delta also supported millions of migratory birds, including
vast numbers of waterbirds, shorebirds, and riparian songbirds.'
The present-day Imperial Valley, occupying the northern portion of the
Delta, is part of what was originally called the "Colorado Desert," a giant alluvial
basin at the northernmost point of the Gulf of California that is transected by
the San Andreas Fault." At its lowest point, due to continuing subsidence as a
45. REISNER, supra note 6, at 124.
46. Id.at 123-24.
47. See NICOLE T. CARTER ET

AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-MExICO WATER
SHARING: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 6 (2013), available athttp://www.fas.org/

sgp/crs/row/R43312.pdf.
48. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo effectively split the indigenous peoples into two
separate communities: the Cocopah in the United States., and the Cucapa in Mexico. EVAN R.
WARD, BORDER OASIS, at xxx (2003); CHARLES BERGMAN, RED DELTA: FIGHTING FOR LIFE AT
THE END OF THE COLORADO RIVER 11 (Marlene Blessing et al. eds., 2002).
49. EDNA JAEL FEIRSTEIN ET AL., SIMULATIONS OF GROUNDWATER CONDITIONS IN THE
COLORADO RIVER DELTA 27-28 (2008).
50. POWELL, supra note 8, at 202; see also WARD, supra note 48, at xx-xxiii; ALDO
LEOPOLD,A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 142-43 (1949) (providing a vibrant and detailed description of the Delta Region even as it existed in 1922).
51.

DANIEL F. LUECKE ET AL., A DELTA ONCE MORE: RESTORING WETLAND AND HABITAT

INTHE COLORADO RIVER DELTA 1-2 (1999), availableat http://wv.edf.org/sites/
default/files/425_delta.pdf.
52. Id, at 2.
53. Colorado River Delta Legacy Program: Where We Work, SONORAN INSTITUTE,
http://wv.sonoraninstitute. org/where-we-work/22-colorado-river-delta.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2014).
54. LUECKE ETAL., supra note 51, at 6.
55. See Geography, SALTON SEA AUTH., http://saltonsea.ca.gov/Resources/Geography (last
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result of seismic activity along the Fault, the valley presently lies 227 feet below
sea level." Although the Colorado River currently flows around the Imperial
Valley to the east, this has not always been the case; historically, the River tended
to oscillate across the vast, relatively flat surface area of the greater Delta Region,
driven by a combination of sedimentation and activity along the fault." Several
times in its geological history, this oscillation caused the River to flow into the
Imperial Valley depression, creating a giant inland sea drained by the Rio Hardy
to the west.5'
In its natural capacity, the Colorado River carried approximately 380,000
tons of silt per day, making it one of the continent's siltiest rivers/' Prior to the
upstream development of large dams and diversions, the River deposited up to
seventy percent of this sediment load in the Delta; coupled with frequent and
capricious flooding and the unusually high (10-meter) ebb and flow of tides in
the upper Gulf of California,' the River created the most unique and biodiverse
ecosystem in the entire Southwest region.' The Cocopah (Kwapa) or "river
people,"" built a rich native culture around the River and its flood cycle.' When
Spanish explorers reached the Mexicali Valley in the 1700s, they observed a
flourishing native population" that harvested corn and grew melons, pumpkins,
and beans."
This native culture was heavily disrupted by European settlement in the
Delta Region,' as well as the division of its homeland by the intercision of the
US-Mexico border as a result of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Although the Cocopah continued to move freely across the border prior to the
1930s, " developments in US immigration policy increasingly frustrated their

accessed Oct. 12, 2014).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See PAT LAFLIN, THE SALTON SEA: CALIFORNIA'S OVERLOOKED TREASURE, (reprt.
1999) (1995), available athttp://www.sci.sdsu.edu/salton/PeriscopeSaltonSeaChl-4.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
59. JIM CARRIER, THE COLORADO: A RIVER AT RISK 19-20 (Rich Clarkson &John Fielder
eds., 1992).
60. LUECKE ET AL., supranote 51, at 2.
61. BERGMAN, supra note 48, at 14; Peter L. Kresan, A Geologic Tour of the Lower Colorado River Region ofArizona andSonora, 39 J. Sw. 567, 576 (1997).
62.
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TRIBEI,

http://wv.cocopah.com/about-us.hml (last visited Sep. 06, 2014).
63. Maria Rosa Garcia-Acevedo, The Confluence of Water, PatternsofSetlenen, andConstructions of the Borderinthe InperialandMexicali Valleys (1900-1999), in REFLECriONS ON
WATER: NEW APPROACHES TO TRANSBOUNDARY CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION 57, 59 (oa-

chim Blatter and Helen Ingramn eds., 2001); see also FEIRSTEIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 28; see
also WARD, supra note 48, at xxv.
64. Explorer Jos&Joaquin de Arrillaga remarked that, along the Rio Hardy, "everything that
the eye can reach is populated, and far from the river." See WARD, supra note 48, at xxx (internal
quotation marks omitted).
65. Id.
66. Seeid. at xxv, xxx, 21-22.
67. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement between the United States of
America and the Mexican Republic, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgol.
68. See Garcia-Acevedo, supra note 63, at 61.
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ability to travel through their native lands."7 Eventually, the Cocopah communities separated and developed into distinct Mexican and US groups-the Cocopa in the United States, and the Cucupa in Mexico." Historical accounts
suggest that around eight thousand native inhabitants lived in the Delta Region
along the river before national borders and development transformed the landscape." Today, a combined population of approximately one thousand US Cocopah and Mexican Cucapa remain in the Delta, which now mostly consists of
agricultural land firaming a dry Colorado River Channel-landscape changes
driven by the imposition of national and state borders, economic development,
and the politics of water."2
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DELTA REGION
Although it is difficult to believe today, steamships navigated the Colorado
River as far inland as Yuma, Arizona, through the first decades of the twentieth
century." However, large-scale agricultural development prompted a wholesale
transformation of the Delta landscape in the early part of the twentieth century.
As discussed further below, this development necessitated the construction of a
vast network of upstream dams and other infrastructure that fundamentally
changed the Delta mad the border region.
1. Imperial Valley Agricultural Development
The California State Legislature first targeted the Imperial Valley for agricultural development during the 1850s; 4 however, the US Senate rejected state
efforts to obtain a federal land grant in the region."7 Years later, in 1892, the
Colorado River Irrigation Company ("CRIC") incorporated"6 and claimed the
ability to irrigate three million acres of farmland with Colorado River waterapproximately one million acres in California's Inperial Valley and two million
acres in the Mexicali Valley in Baja California, Mexico." An economic depression drove CRIC to failure in 1894, but its company engineer, Charles Rockwood, formed the California Development Company ("CDC") soon thereafter."8 Despite the fact that the Mexican Constitution prohibited foreigners from
purchasing land within one hundred kilometers of the border, then Mexican
president Porfirio Diaz allowed a Mexican developer, Guillermo Andrade, to
sell CDC's Mexican subsidiary one hundred thousand acres of land along the
69. Id.
70. WATERMAN, supra note 43, at 267; Garcia-Acevedo, supra note 63, at 61.
71. WATERMAN, supra note 43, at 267; see also COCOPAn INDIAN TRIBE, supra note 62.
72. COCOPAH INDIAN TRIBE, supranote 62; see ifra, Parts II.C, 1II.
73. RobertJerome Glennon & Peter W. Culp, The Last Green Lagoon: How and Wly the
Bush Adinhistration Should Save the ColoradoRiver Delta, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 905 (2002)
[hereinafter Last Green Lagoonl.
74. ERIc A. STENE, BUREAU OF REcLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ALLAMERICAN CANAL: BOULDER CANYON PROJECT 3 (rev. ed. 2009), available at http://iwv.
usbr.gov/projects//IageSererimgNane=Doc_ 1262724516142.pdf.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. SeeTitle Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cal. Dev. Co., 152 P. 542, 545 (Cal. 1915); To Irriate An-d
Lands; Incorporationof the Colorado River Company,N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1893.
78. See Garcia-Acevedo, supranote 63, at 63-64.
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Alamo Canal; 9 CDC additionally promised to deliver the water necessary to
irrigate six hundred thousand acres in Mexico's Mexicali Valley. 0
In 1901 the CDC constructed a wooden headgate and excavated a
four-mile-long channel approximately five hundred feet north of the international border to divert water from the Colorado River into the ancient Alamo
River riverbed in Mexico." On May 14 of the samne year the first successful
diversion of the Colorado River flowed into the Imperial Valley. " At that point,
CDC officials renamed the uninspiring "Colorado Desert" and its "Salton Sink"
the "Imperial Valley" in an effort to entice settlement." The first settlers arrived
shortly thereafter from the Salt River Valley in Arizona, and within three years
more than seven thousand people inhabited de Imperial Valley.' Reflecting
the broader evolution of international water law away from its initial focus on
navigation towards non-navigational uses,' the CDC also became engaged in a
contentious dispute with Mexico over the navigable status of the Colorado
River, which had direct bearing on the legality of US diversions from the River
to facilitate settlement.!6
This first successful diversion of Colorado River water to the Imperial Valley was short-lived, but it had a lasting effect on the region's landscape. The
River's heavy silt load quickly clogged the diversion channel, prompting CDC
to build a new headgate just across the border in Mexico. " By 1905 the CDC
had cut a three thousand-foot diversion channel and was awaiting approval from
the Mexican government to install a new intake headgate.9 Shortly thereafter,
the River's southerrnost US tributary, the Gila River, flooded and abruptly
demonstrated the perils of engineering around the River's highly variable flows.
The floodwaters punched through the CDC bypass channel, quickly eroding it
to the point where it was nearly a mile wide, and diverted the entire flow of the
River into the old Alamo channel and into the Imperial Valley." The resulting

79. See WARD, supra note 48, at 5; NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., W'ATER ANID THE XvVEsT: THE
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE POLrncs OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WVEsT 22 (2009).
80. HUNDI.EY, supra note 79, at 22.
81. STENE, supra note 74, at 4. The Alamo River riverbed was an older geologic channel of
the Colorado River that could be used to carn water through Mexico to the Imperial Valley, reentering the United States near Calexico, California. See POWELL, supra note 8, at 62-63.
82. POvEI.L, supna note 8, at 63.
83. See id. at 62; VORSTER, supra note 1, at 196; HUNDLEY, supia note 79, at 21.
84. \VORSTER, supra note 1, at 196.
85. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 1,at 11 -12, 58-63.
86. Garcia-Acevedo, supma note 63, at 67; cf Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of
the International Commission of the River Oder, Judgment No. 16, 1929 I.CJ. (ser. A) No. 23,
at 27 (Sept. 10) (where "a single waterway traverses or separates the territory of more than one
State, and the possibility of fulfilling the requirements ofjustice and the considerations of itility
which this fa~ct places in relief, it is at once seen that a solution of the problem has been sought
not in the idea of a right of passage in favour of upstreamn States, but in that of a community of
interest of riparian States. This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a
common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States
in the user [sic]
of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of
any one riparian State in relation to the others.").
87. POWELL, supra note 8, at 63.
88. Id.
89. Tide Ins. & Trust Co. v.Cal. Dev. Co., 152 P. 542,546 (Cal. 1915); POWELL, suplra note
8, at 63; see alSo 'WATERM.AN, supranote 43, at 257; HUNDLEY, supia note 79, at 27.
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disaster nearly destroyed the city of Mexicali and generated a vast headcut (approaching eighty feet high and one thousand feet wide) that threatened communities throughout the lower portions of the River.' It also filled the Salton Sink
(Imperial Valley's lowest point) with water, creating the present-day Salton Sea."
It ultimately took two years of costly effort-undertaken by the Southern
Pacific Railroad with pressure from the US federal government-to reroute the
Colorado to its original path." Thousands of railroad cars loaded with rock
were deployed to close the breach, with work continuing night and day for
months. " The scale of the disaster catalyzed government intervention under
the Reclamation Act, prompting the construction of federally-controlled water
infrastructure in the Imperial Valley and the rest of the Lower Basin; " it also
became one of the primary justifications for constructing the Hoover Dan to
serve as a flood management tool.
These early attempts to develop the Colorado River made the United States
acutely aware of the potential for conflict with Mexico over the River's resources, due to the fact that much of the Imperial Valley's delivery infrastructure
(mainly the Alamo canal) was outside of US jurisdiction."s "The border and the
binational aspects of delta water relations also encouraged farmers, developers,
and politicians [in the United States] to worry about what would happen to regional water supplies should development [in Mexico] drastically increase.""9 In
1911 the Salton Sea experience and the risk of future flooding, along with the
potential increase in Mexican water consumption, led the newly-created Imperial Irrigation District ("IID")7 to lobby the federal government for an "AllAmerican" canal that would provide a reliable source of Colorado River water
running entirely through US territory."
By 1925 the population of the Imperial Valley had grown to fifty thousand
inhabitants and the region produced crops that were shipped east year round. "
Among the many agricultural goods produced in the highly productive region
were cotton, cantaloupes, lettuce, milk fat, waternelons, peas, asparagus, tomatoes, milo maize, wheat, alfalfa hay, sheep, poultry, and eggs.'" By 1927 the
Imperial Valley diverted roughly three million acre-feet ("maP') of Colorado
River water for irrigation annually.'

90.

WILLIAM DEBuYS &JOAN MYERS, SALT DREAMS: LAND AND WATER IN Low-Do\VN

CALIFORNIA 65 (1999); see also Tide Ins.& Trust Co., 152 P. at 546.

91.

Title Ins. & Trust Co., 152 P. at 546.

92. See HUNDLEY, supra note 79, at 27.

93. See Title Ins. & 7)vst Co., 152 P. at 546; see also DEBuYS & MYERS, supra note 90, at
103-113; POWELL, supwr note 8, at 63.
94.
95.
96.

Garcia-Acevedo, supia note 63, at 67.
WORSTER, supra note 1, at 207.
\VARD, supra note 48, at 41.

97. Following CDC's bankruptcy in the wake of the Salton Sea disaster, Southern Pacific
Railroad engineered the takeover of the majority of CDC's land and infrastructure assets to cover
its expenses in shoring up the Colorado River channel; the Imperial Irrigation District ("ID")
was then created to take over and operate the Imperial Valley infrastructure. See Tide Ins. &
Trst Co., 152 P. at 549; STENE, supra note 74, at 5.
98. PO\VELL, supra note 8, at 64.
99.

WORSTER,

100.

Id.

101.

Id.

supranote 1, at 200.

Issue I

GETTNG TO THE RIGHTSIDE OF THE RIVER

2. Mexicali Valley Agricultural Development
Agricultural development in the Mexicali Valley-a broad, flat basin running
from the south end of the Imperial Valley to the Gulf of California-followed a
parallel course to that of its US counterpart in the Imperial Valley. Long before
an international water-sharing agreement was in place between the two countries, Mexican farmers were withdrawing water from the Colorado River."2 As
the CDC's irrigation activities attracted US settlement in the Imperial Valley,
the flow of Mexican settlers to the Mexicali Valley began almost contemporaneously in 1902." Playing its role in "a bilateral pursuit for economic independence within the context of asymmetrical interdependence,"' the Mexican
Government began its own project of "manifest destiny" and the national integration of Baja California by encouraging its people to migrate north and to
occupy the Delta Region."'°
In the early 1900s the Colorado River Land Company ("CRLC") became
the dominant player in the Mexicali Valley.' 6 In the three years prior to his
death in 1905, Andrade (tie Mexican developer who facilitated CDC's purchase of land surrounding the Alamo Canal) sold roughly eight hundred thousand acres in the Mexicali Valley to the newly incorporated CRLC.'7° The
CRLC ultimately bought up most of the CDC land holdings in the Mexicali
Valley and had a menbership that overlapped considerably with large Imperial
Valley landowners.' " The CRLC's reluctance to allow lessees and fanmvorkers
to establish permanent settlement on its land quickly led to heavy centralization
of fann labor populations in the city of Mexicali."
As had occurred in the United States, while entrepreneurs undertook the
initial development of water infrastructure in Mexico, both practical and political issues led to increasing government involvement in water management and
development."' Although Mexican concerns over the diminishment of Colorado River navigability as a result of upstream diversions were insufficient to
drive US federal government intervention in the region,"' the imperatives
around flood management eventually led to large-scale federal infrastructure
construction. Social factors also drove increasing government intervention on
both sides of the border. In the United States, for example, landowners and
water users in the Imperial Valley eventually formed the Imperial Valley Water
Users Association and began to oppose the land companies' control over water

102,
103.

Id.at 273.

104.
105.

WARD,

106.

Garcia-Acevedo, supra note 63, at 64.

Garcia-Acevedo, supranote 63, at 64.
supra note 48, at 20.
Id. at 13-15.

107. WARD, supw note 48, at 5.
108. Garcia-Acevedo, supra note 63, at 64, 66.
109. I. at 64. Several commentators have noted that this early pattern of settlement inhibited
social mobility and contributed to many of the contemporary problems with poverty and inunigration in Baja California, including the Imperial Valley's exploitation of cheap Mexican l'rm
labor throughout the twentieth century.
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112-13 (rev.ed. 2006).
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resources, citing high prices and insufficient supplies."' On the Mexican side,
opposition to the CRLC's presence in the Mexicali Valley developed during the
Mexican Civil War and led to increasing' pressure to decentralize land ownership."'
As discussed further below, the 1922 Colorado River Compact, which allocated Colorado River water among the US Basin States, did not include Mexico,.' leaving Mexico in an uncertain position with regard to water supply in
both Baja California and Sonora."' In 1937, following repeated denied requests
for a definitive statement of Mexico's rights to the Colorado River, Mexican
President Lazaro Cfirdenas moved to expropriate the CRLC's eight hundred
thousand acres of land in the Mexicali Valley as part of a bid to secure additional
Colorado River flows through the expansion of agriculture in northern Mexico. "' The construction of the All-Anerican Canal, which gave the US exclusive
control of its Imperial Valley diversions, further convinced Mexico that the expropriation was necessary to secure its right to the River."' At the time, international legal principles of equal use remained unclear, but Mexican experts believed that future arbitration would result in grants to use water for land under
development. ' Following the seizure of the CRLC holdings, the Mexican government decentralized farmland ownership in the Mexicali Valley." '
By 1937, 133,906 acres of land in the Mexicali Valley were irrigated by the
Colorado River, and by the end of the 1950s Mexican irrigation from the river
peaked at 475,955 acres, at which point groundwater withdrawals became necessary to meet irrigation water demands.'' As the anount of irrigated acreage
expanded in Mexico and the United States, the demand for cheap labor in the
Imperial Valley also grew and the region's population rose rapidly. ' In 1940
there were 45,569 inhabitants in the Mexicali Valley, mad by 1957 that figure
increased to 192,500. ' Ballooning population growth in the Mexicali Valley
continued into the twenty-first century.'

112. Id.
113. Id. at 67-68, 74, 76-78.
114. See ch. 72, 42 Stat. 171 (1921) (authorizing the states to enter into a compact); see ;dso
Colorado River Compact, CoiO. REV. ST,\T. ANN. § 37-61-101 (2014).
115. The Compact reads, in relevant )art, as follows: "If, as a matter of international comitv,
the United States of America shall hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right
to the use of any waters of the Colorado River System, such waters shall be supplied first from
the waters which are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in paragraphs
(a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this ptrt)ose, then, the hurden of such
deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the States of the Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Feny water to supply one-half of the
deliciency so recognized in addition to that provided in paragraph (d)." Colorado River Compact
art. 111(c).
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120.
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Id. at 15-16.
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Id. at 29-32.
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3. Upstream US Dam Development
On December 21, 1928, Congress approved the Boulder Canyon Project
Act ("BCPA"),' authorizing the construction of two integral infrastructure projects: (i) the present day Hoover Dam, designed to alleviate flooding in the Imperial Valley and create significant water storage; and (ii) the All-Airierican Canal, which, upon completion in 1940, provided de-silted water to the nearly five
hundred thousand acres of existing irrigated land in the Imperial Valley.'"
Each of the BCPA's authorized projects increased regional competition for
Colorado River water and strained binational relations. The filling of Lake
Mead behind Hoover Dam marked the beginning of long-term diminished
river flows to Mexico (and to the Delta's estuaries and wetlands) and paved the
way for other large dans on the River.'2 ' Meanwhile, the construction of the
All-American Canal-which today diverts roughly twenty percent of the River's
entire flow at Imperial Dam" 7-increased water delivery reliability for Imperial
Valley agriculture," decreased certainty for Mexican farmers in the Mexicali
Valley, and widened the divide of mistrust over international sharing of Colorado River water.'"
Although the All-American Canal was far less celebrated than the Hoover
Dana, its implications for Mexican water users were arguably greater. With a
maximum carrying capacity of 15,155 cubic feet per second, the eighty-milelong canal remains the largest irrigation diversion in the world."0 Moreover, the
completion of the canal left Mexico's Alamo Canal-the natural diversion channel through which Imperial Valley irrigation water previously flowed--dry.' '
Mexico was thus more vulnerable to water shortage, necessitating its procurement of a legally protected Mexican allocation as well as extensive construction
of diversion infrastructure to support continued agriculture and municipal
growth in the Mexicali Valley.'
Following the completion of the Hoover Darn, the United States embarked
upon an unprecedented mad unparalleled program of water development in the
Colorado River Basin."" The United States and various local agencies in the
Basin ultimately constructed a system of reservoirs on the Colorado River capable of collectively storing in excess of sixty million acre-feet of water.' The
124. Boulder Canyon Project Act, Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C § 617 (2012)).
125. Stene, supra note 74, at 5-6.
126. See HUNDLEY, supa note 44, at 102-04; POWELL, supianote 8, at 83.
127. MJ Cohen, 77ie Colorado River Basi, H:\RC.EDU, at 7 (Apr. 2014), available at
http://wv.harc.edu/sites/defaul/Files/Pr-ojectLDocunens/Rel)ort%20l %20-%2Colorado%
20River.pdf.
128. See All-American Canal, IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIsT., http://w.iid.con/index
aspxi'page=177 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
129. WARD, supra note 48, at 24-25; see also W I'ERMAN, supla note 43, at 270-71.
130. All-American Canal, Image of the Daji NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY, http://earh
observatorv.nasa.gov/IOTD/\iew.php?id1=37078 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014); All-American Cmal,
supvra note 128.
131. See All-American Canal, supra note 128; IID 1,Vater Histoy, IMPERIAL IRtRIGATION
=
DisT., http://www.iid.com/index.aspx?page 125 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
132. WARD, supra note 48, at 24-25.
133. See REISNER, supra note 6, at 259-305.
134. Statement of Michael L. Connor, supra note 18; POWELL, supra note 8, at 7.
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Basin's major storage dams include the massive Hoover and Glen Canyon
Dams and the smaller Parker and Davis Darns in the Lower Basin, and numerous other large dams in the Upper Basin." Taken together, these structures
can store more than four times the average annual yield of the River, and have
transformed a river with an annual yield that once fluctuated between as little as
four million acre-feet to more than thirty million acre-feet into a relatively stable,
predictable water supply to support farms, cities, and industry throughout the
Basin and beyond.'
To take advantage of this storage system, US agencies and water users constructed an equally impressive system of major and minor structures that divert,
return, re-divert, and consume in excess of ninety percent of the River's annual
yield."' With over seventy percent of demand for Colorado River water coining
from areas located outside of the watershed boundaries, diversions have been
of utmost importance for water suppliers."' Major diversions include the Colorado-Big Thompson Project and the Moffat Tunnel, providing water to Front

Range users in the Upper Basin state of Colorado; the All-American Canal; the
Colorado River Aqueduct, delivering water to the Southern California coast; the
Central Arizona Project ("CAP"), serving the farms and cities of Central Arizona; and the Southern Nevada Water Authority's ("SNWA") system, pumping
water from Lake Mead to the Las Vegas area. 39' Reclamation has projected that,
as of 2003, these diversions, together with smaller diversions, the water deliveries to Mexico, evaporation, and various other "system losses," consume all of
the water available for development on the Colorado River."'
Morelos Dam is the only major dam on the Mexican portion of the River.
The dam diverts essentially all of the remaining flow of the Colorado River (in
135. See Dams along the Lower Colordo River, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S.DEP'T OF
http:// wv.usbr.gov/lc/vuma/facilities/dams/yaodams_nap.htnl (last updated
July 27, 2012); Facilites by Region, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
http://wv.usbr.gov/projects/FacilitiesByRegion. jsp? RegionName=Upper9620Colorado (last
updated May 1, 2007).
136. See Statement of Michael L. Connor, supra note 18; Colorado River Storage Project,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S.DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, http://No.usbr.gov/projects/Project.
jspprojName=Colorado+River+Storage+Project (last updated May 4, 2010).
137. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 29, at art. 10 (discussing United States' obligation to
deliver 1.5 maf to Mexico, and general administrative procedures); See COLORADO RIVER BASIN
WATER SUPPLY, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that the Colorado River's average historical flow is 16.4
maf per year); POWELL, supranote 8, at 210 ("Thus Mexico, once the destination of 100 percent
of the water in the lower Colorado, had to settle for 10 percent).
THE INTERIOR,

138.
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at iii (2011), available at http://pacinst.org/-%p-content/uploads/sites/21/2013/02/crb_water_
8 21 _2011.pdf.
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INTERIOR, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/projects.jsp (last
updated Jan. 24, 2008); PRker Dam
and Powerplant BUREAU OF RECLAMATION LOWER COLO. REGION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://wwv.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/hrochures/parker.html (last updated Sep. 2013);
Diision.5 (GlenwoodSprings): ColoradoRiver Basin, COLO. DEP'T OF NAT. RES., http://
water.state.co.us/DiisionsOffices/Div5ColoradoRiverBasin/Pages/Div5ColoradoRB.aspx
(last
-visited Oct. 18, 2014); Regionad Water System, S. NEV. \WATER AUTH., http://wv.snwa.com

/about/regional.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
140. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER
CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES REPORT 2001-2005, at iv (Dec. 2011) available at

http://ww.usbr.gov/uc/librar,/envdocs/reports/crs/pdfs/cul2OOl-O5.pdf (summary of water usage from 2001-2005 and system losses for the period).
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non-flood years) to the Mexicali Valley."' Morelos Dam sends water into a
portion of the original Alamo Canal, then through the Canal Reforma, and finally throughout the Mexicali Valley via a substantial network of primary and
secondary canals.' Prior to the 2010 Mexicali Valley earthquake," there were
approximately 470 km (292 mi) of primary canals, 2,399 km (1,490 mi) of secondary canals, and a total of 1,662 km (1,033 mi) of primary and secondary
drains in the Mexicali Valley.'"
C. PRESENT-DAY WATER USE IN THE DELTA REGION

Twentieth century development of the River in the Lower Basin and along
the international border facilitated widespread use of the river by federal, state,
and local entities in the United States." Under present-day conditions, Imperial
Dam diverts approximately 3.1 maf of the Colorado River through the AllAmerican Canal to support Imperial Valley agriculture and to provide water to
seven municipalities."' Although the Imperial Valley grows a variety of highervalue crops,"' it is also the number one alfalfa-growing region in the world."
This "thirsty crop" was responsible for nearly twenty percent of California's agricultural water use in 2000,'' supporting California's dairy industry as well as
growing US domestic commerce and international exports." ° Arizona also
takes considerable Colorado River water from both the All-American Canal
(diverted from the Canal at a point downstream and passed back under the
Colorado River via the Yuma Siphon) and the Gila Gravity Main Canal (which
leaves Imperial Dam on the Arizona side of the River).' The water is used for
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FEIRSTEIN. supra note 49, at 38.

142. Id.
143. See 7.2-Magnitude Quake near Mexcali Mexico: Image of the Day, NASA EARTH
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com/index.aspxpage=4 (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
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agriculture in the Yurna, Arizona region and in the nearby Wellton-Mohawk
2
Irrigation District, located along the last reach of the Gila River.""
Yuma County
hosts the majority of Arizona's agricultural lands and provides a substantial portion of the United States' winter vegetable crop."'
On the other side of tie border, Mexico diverts between 1.5 maf and 1.6
maf of Colorado River water each year-its regular 1944 Water Treaty allocation of 1.5 maf' plus an additional quantity of unscheduled water the United
States regularly delivers each year as a result of cancelled water orders.' Mexico is also heavily reliant on groundwater pumping, extracting an average of
roughly eight hundred thousand acre-feet annually from the Mexicali Valley aquifer" 6 In total, the Colorado River irrigates just over six hundred thousand
acres of farmland in the Mexicali Valley,"7 producing predominantly wheat, cotton, alfalfa, and vegetables.' 5
Water use for municipal purposes is gradually trending upwards throughout the Colorado River Basin. Significant municipal uses in Arizona include
more than 1.5 maf of diversions each year through the CAP-a substantial fraction of which supports cities and developments in central Arizona, including the
Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas-and around forty-three thousand
acre-feet of municipal use in the City of Yuma area. ' In California, the Metropolitan Water District ("MiWD") delivers water to twenty-six different municipal water agencies, twenty-three of which receive water pumped from Lake
Havasu by the Whitsett Intake Plant through the Colorado River Aqueduct. '
Southern California's greater Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas,
with populations of 18.2 million and 3 million people, respectively, represent
the greatest municipal demand in the region.''
In Mexico, municipal water supply is a less significant source of overall demand. Per capita water use in Mexican cities-including those that rely on the
Colorado River for their water supply-generally is much lower than in the
United States.' 2 In 2008 Colorado River water deliveries to Tijuana and Mexicali, the two largest Mexican cities in the region,' were 82,100 acre-feet and
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152.
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wwv.usbr.gov/Ic/region/programs/drop2/env(ocs/flnalea/fea 1.pdf.
156. See FEIRSTEIN, supra note 49, at 54-55.
157. LELLOUCH ET AL., supra note 40, at 35.
158. LUKAS BRUNEr. AL, CENTER ON GLOBALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, & COMPETrFIVENESS,
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159. COiEN, supra note 138, at 14.
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69,472 acre-feet, respectively.'" As in the United States, most of Mexico's largest municipal users of the Colorado River lie outside of the Colorado River
Basin. The Tijuana aqueduct carries water to the Pacific coast for municipal
use in Tijuana, the region's largest Mexican municipal area with a population of
roughly 1,650,000 and an average annual growth rate of 5.5 percent since
1950.'5

M. THE US-MEXIco

BORDER WATER RELATIONSHIP

"In terms of binational relations, perhaps no region better exemplifies some
of the tensions and complexities of diplomacy between Mexico and the United
States [than the Colorado River borderlands]."
For the past two centuries the United States and Mexico have vied for territory, natural resources, and sovereignty through the development of a welldefined and well-regulated border. Perhaps not surprisingly, the United States
has disproportionately influenced the ebb and flow of this power struggle, as it
has generally been able to stay several steps ahead of Mexico on the economic
development curve. Professor Evan R. Ward aptly described this power struggle as "a bilateral pursuit for economic independence within the context of
asymmetrical interdependence...
While the relationship between the United States and Mexico is extraordinarily complex, the history of the US-Mexico border relationship has had observable and profound influences on the development of the Colorado River
region. Conversely, many of the most important binational issues between the
countries have concerned, either directly or indirectly, the development of water resources on the border. For example, as discussed below in Part III.C, one
of the most sensitive contemporary binational border issues-immigration-has
historical roots in the physical and legal development of the Colorado River
Basin. ' The complex and often subtle interrelationships between broader border issues and the management of water were important components of the
multiple barriers to transboundary cooperation that were overcome during the
Minute 319 process.
A. THE INTEIRNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION
Globally, the process of delineating borders between nations has tended to
be a foremost cause of tension and conflict. " In very few cases have nations
drawn borders peacefully; border demarcation efforts typically give way to
power politics or military threats, if not outright warfare. '" Consequently, natural resource issues in border regions usually cannot be cleanly separated from
larger geopolitical and economic realities, and the Delta Region has been no

164. Id. at 34.

165. Id. at 33-34.
166. WARD, supra note 48, at 20.
167. Id.
168. See infra Part III.C.
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exception.
The US-Mexico border relationship has long been a source of controversy
between the two governments, not in the least due to its roots in a bitter military
and economic conflict during the 1800s that was generally resolved against Mexico's interests."' Mexico lost over half of its sovereign territory to the United
States with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the subsequent Gadsden Purchase in 1853."' Even after the conclusion of the Mexican-American
War, difficulties in the international relationship persisted, including substantial
tensions related to the movement of immigrant populations, incursions across
the border during the Indian wars and the US Civil War, racial and cultural
differences, and the ownership and use of land and resources along the border
during westward expansion (for example, the previously-discussed land disputes
involving the CDC, CRLC, and US and Mexican governments)."'
The IBWC, the primary agency responsible for the international management of the Colorado River (among other responsibilities), evolved out of the
US and Mexican governments' mutual need to manage border movement issues." 4 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo established the Rio Grande River as
a substantial portion of the US-Mexico border; it also designated a twenty-threemile reach of the Colorado River (known as the limitrophe reach) as a portion
of the international border between Mexico and Arizona."' Even after the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo formally settled the location of the border, riverbed accretion"' continued to cause significant portions of the river boundary
to shift over time.'" As agricultural development and settlement took place in
these river-boundary areas, the need arose to establish jurisdictional rules for
dealing with the two rivers' tendency to shift their banks."'
The Convention of 1884 adopted the requisite rules, and five years later
the Convention of 1889 created the International Boundary Commission
("IBC") and vested it with decision-making and administrative power over the
previously adopted rules pertaining to the two rivers where they served as international boundaries."' The Convention of 1884 limited the IBC's initial power
to resolving border disputes resulting from changes in the riverbeds (accretion),
future river infrastructure, and any other cause affecting the international borderline.' °

171. Id.at6-7.
172. Garcia-Acevedo, supra note 63, at 69.
173. See WARD, supra note 48, at 3-22.
174. See Convention Touching the International Boundary-Line Where it Follows the Bed of
the Rio Colorado, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 12, 1884, T.S. No. 226 thereinafter Convention of 18841.
175. See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 67, art. V; COHEN, supa note 138, at i.
176. Accretion is the increase of property by gradual natural additions, as of land by alluvium.
BLACK'S LA\v DICTIONARY 23 (9th ed. 2009).
177. SeegenerallyConventionof 1884, supra note 174.
178. Historyof the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, INT'L BOUNDARY AND
WVATER COMM'N, http://www.ibwc.state.gov/AboutUs/history.hm-l (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
179. Convention to Facilitate the Carrying Out of the Principles Contained in the Treaty of
November 12, 1884, and to Avoid the Difficulties Occasioned by Reason of the Changes Which
Take Place in the Beds of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers, U.S.-Mex., Mar. 1, 1889, T.S.
No. 232, art. 1 [hereinafter Convention of 18891.
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Sixty years after the United States and Mexico drafted the first rules governing boundary water disputes, it became increasingly obvious that binational water issues affected not just the borderline, but also the borderlands in general."'
As a result, the two countries seized the opportunity while negotiating the 1944
Water Treaty to expand the IBC into the IBWC and to substantially increase
its responsibilities.' 2 Known as La Comisi6n Internacional de Limites y Aguas
("CILA") in Mexico,'' this binational agency consists of a US Section (the
IBWC) based in El Paso, Texas, and a Mexican section (the CILA) based in
JuSirez, Mexico.' The IBWC is a subsidiary agency of the US Department of
State, while CILA is a subsidiary of the Mexican Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de Mdxico.
The 1944 Water Treaty authorizes the IBWC to (i) build and manage waterworks; (ii) resolve problems and negotiate further agreements regarding international waters; and (iii) settle treaty interpretation disputes, subject to each
country's approval.'86 The agency also has authority over the boundary delineation along the land boundary, the boundary sections of the Rio Grande and
Colorado Rivers, the works situated on their common boundary, and any project that lies entirely within either country if its construction or management will
affect international treaty compliance.'"' Thus, the IBWC's jurisdiction encompasses the entire border region, including dry lands and rivers, and includes the
The
resolution of water disputes and "virtually any border-related issue.
IBWC's decisions, known 0as "Minutes,"8 . generally have the status of executive
agreements under US law' and are deemed approved by each country unless
181. See WARD, supranote 48, at 23.
182. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 29, arts. 2, 24.
183. Id. art. 2.
184. The InternationalBoundar, and Water Commission - Its Mission, Organizationand
Procedures for Solution of Boundary and Water Problems, INT'L BOUNDARY AND WATER
COMMISSION, http://www.ibwc.state.gov/About__Us/AboutUs.htinl (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
185. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 29, at art. 2.
186. See id. at art. 24. The IBWC's jurisdiction under the 1944 Water Treaty consists of
three distinct categories: its adjudicative functions, which give it power to call wimesses and bring
actions in the courts of the United States and Mexico; its administrative functions, which allow
the IBWC to undertake construction projects and similar activities to carry out agreements; and
its investigative functions, which allow the IBWC to develop and collect information relevant to
water management and the IBWC's other functions. George R. Hesse, Securing Tangible Results ofSelf-Determination:A Scheme to Solicit Support from the InternationalBoundaryand
Water Commission for Indigenous Peoples' Water Rights Claims, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
149, 154 (1991).
187. Marc A. Sinclair, The Environmental CooperationAgreenent Between Mexico and the
UnitedStates:A Response to the Pollution Problemsofthe Borderlands,19 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
87, 111-12 (1986).
188. Hesse, supranote 186, at 153-54.
189. See INT'L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM'N, U.S. SEC., STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2008-FY
2013, at 1 (Dec. 2008), availableathttp://www.ibwc.state.gov/files/fy,06-strategic-plan.pdf.
190. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference andForeignAfiairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 657
(2000) ("Executive agreements are, quite simply, international agreements concluded by the Executive without resort to the Article II senatorial consent process"); see generally RobertJerome
Glennon, The Status ofInternationalLaw in United States Domestic Law, 6 KANTO GAKUIN
LAW REVIEw 1, 2-18 (1996) (Japan) (explaining international law's effect on domestic law) (on
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disapproved within thirty days after execution by the IBWC Comnissioners."'
In practice, however, the IBWC has lhistorically avoided political controversy by focusing on problems that it could solve in a more technical capacity,
such as flood control problems, municipal sewage treatment issues, joint waterway management projects, monitoring and detection of boundary problems,
and the collection and distribution of hydrological information in the border
region. ' Nevertheless, the IBWC's authority is potentially quite broad. For
example, Minute 261 expressly recognized the IBWC's authority over problems that concern health and safety or that impair beneficial uses of international waters; Minute 261 also established the IBWC's independent authority
to determine when such problems exist. 3 As such, the "IBWC's jurisdiction
over water quantity and quality issues is well-established and extensive," making
it the established forum to facilitate infrastructure projects, water transfers, and
cooperative management prograns within the framework of the Law of the

River.'9 '

B. US-MEXICO WATER SHARING: A CONTENTIOUS PAST

Until the 1944 Water Treaty, the United States essentially undertook Colorado River operations in accordance with the Harmon Doctrine-asserting
that, as the upstrean sovereign, it had the right to all of the water originating
within its territory. ' Given the hydrological realities of the Colorado River Basin (i.e., the fact that nearly all flows originate in the US portion of the Basin),
this left Mexico without any certain claim on the use of the River. Even as

customary international law began to shift towards equitable utilization, Mexico
was wary that the United States' delay in acknowledging a Mexican right to the

51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1481, 1487 (1994); see generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is
NAFTA Constitutional?,108 HARv. L. REV. 801 (1995). Their acceptance as valid international
agreements tinder US law results from the Executive's repeated use of them for more than two
hundred years, a series of Supreme Court cases, and a long history of congressional acquiescence
in the practice. Donald P. Oulton, A Review of Evecutive Agreements from the Standpoint of
Curent Case Law, 23 SupFOLK TRANSNAT'LL. REV. 101, 107 (1999). There are three types of
executive agreements: (i) "treaty authorized executive agreementsi," which are executive agreements Congress authorizes under the terms of a treaty or are otherwise required to successfully
carry out the terms of a treaty; (ii) "congressional-executive agreement[sl," which are executive
agreements Congress approves in advance or ratifies after the fact by a majority vote of both
Houses in a joint resolution; and (iii) "sole-executive agreement[s]," which are executive agreements entered into under the President's authority alone. Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty
Power,51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1089, 1092-93 (1990). As a general rule, both treaty-executive and
congressional-executive agreements enjoy the same status as treaties under US law. See Curtis A.
Bradley, The Treaty Power andAmerican Federalism,97 Micii. L. REv. 390, 398 (1998). For
instance, because the provisions of Minute 319 are fully accomplished within the enumerated
limits of IBWC authority under the 1944 Water Treaty, Minute 319 did not require congressional ratification and thus would be a treaty-executive agreement for purposes of US law. See
generallyMinute No. 319, supra note 25.
191. 1944 Water Treaty, supranote 29, art. 25.
192. Sinclair, supranote 187, at 112, 114.
193. See Int'l Boundary and Water Comm'n [IBWC], Minute No. 261: Recommendations
for the Solution to the Border Sanitation Problem (Sept. 24, 1979); Sinclair, supra note 187, at
119-20.
194. Last Green Lagoon, supra note 73, at 978.
195. See supra note 9.
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river would ultimately weaken Mexico's claim in light of the United States' continued efforts to develop and acquire more and more vested rights to the water
of the River.'96 Throughout the early part of the twentieth century, Mexico
therefore made repeated requests to the United States for a legally protected
River allocation.
1. 1922 Colorado River Compact
The 1922 Colorado River Compact ("1922 Compact" or "Compact") was
the first congressionally ratified US interstate water compact.' ' The Compact
allocated the water of the River among the US states of the Upper Basin (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, along with a small portion of Arizona) and the Lower Basin (Arizona, California, and Nevada). ' It apportioned
7.5 maf per annum to each Basin, requiring the Upper Basin to deliver no less
than seventy-five maf every ten years to the Lower Basin at Lee Ferry, a point
on the riverjust below Glen Canyon Dam in Northern Arizona.'9 This delivery
requirement effectively gave the Lower Basin the highest priority right."'. The
Compact also gave the Lower Basin a right to an additional one maf of tributary
water beyond these initial allocations.'
Ironically, the 1922 Compact materialized in part out of various upstream
states' efforts to frustrate California's desire for equitable apportionment-a
principle that was growing in prevalence internationally in the form of the doctrine of equitable utilization-in the Colorado River Basin. ' Recognizing that
they would lose out in a race to develop with California, the other Basin states
sought to prevent California from acquiring greater rights to the Colorado River
under equitable apportiomnent."' Accordingly, the Basin states sought out an
agreement to apportion the Colorado River into set amounts during the 1922
Compact negotiations."9 In keeping with these underlying motives, the Compact negotiations did not include Mexico, and the United States continued to
resist granting Mexico a guaranteed right to Colorado River water throughout
the 1920s and 1930s.' 5
Although the 1922 Compact did not directly address the allocation of water
to Mexico, it did recognize that "as a matter of international comity" the United
States could recognize a Mexican water right." This water would first come
196. See supra Part ll.B. Under the equitable apportionment and equitable utilization doctrines, courts consider, inter am, the extent to which a party has already developed; thus, a more
developed state is likely to receive a greater allocation of transboundary water resource based on

its existing need for water. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 314 (1984).
197. See generally Colorado River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-61-101 (2014).
Interstate compacts settle various disputes by mutual agreement between the states. The US
Constitution impliedly recognizes states' power to negotiate and enter into interstate compacts
with congressional approval. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, el. 3.
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199. Id. art. II(a), (d).
200.
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from the water the Compact does not allocate; in the event that there was insufficient unallocated water, the obligation to meet any Mexican treaty obligation
would be shared equally by both the Upper and Lower Basin. 07'
Subsequent to the 1922 Compact's division of the Colorado River among
the Upper and Lower Basins, the states of the Upper Basin entered into the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948, which divided their share of
the River among Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and a small area of
northern Arizona." The 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act,"9 combined with
a decree by the United States Supreme Court pursuant to its decision in Arizona
v. CahTornia,"' accomplished a similar division anong the Lower Basin states.
2. 1944 Water Treaty
In the 1940s the United States finally acquiesced to Mexico's persistent requests to recognize its entitlements to the Colorado River (as well as the Rio
Grande) and entered into the 1944 Water Treaty." In entering into the Treaty
negotiations, the United States, which was then heavily engaged in World War
II, was at least partially motivated by the need to strengthen its alliance and reNonetheless, increasing water demand in Baja Calilationship with Mexico.'
fornia and Sonora, along with the US State Department's general desire to
maintain strong relations with Mexico and to obtain international recognition of
its Good Neighbor policy, also helped to fuel both local and national interest in
reaching the 1944 agreement."'
The 1944 Water Treaty obligates the United States to deliver 1.5 maf of
water annually to Mexico, except in times of "extraordinary drought," in which
case Mexico's allocation would decrease "in the same proportion" as the reduction of consumptive use in the United States.2 ' The Treaty also stipulated that
in times of surplus the United States would deliver up to two hundred thousand
acre-feet of additional water, but that Mexico would not acquire any right to the
flow of the Colorado River beyond the guaranteed 1.5 maf.25
Pursuant to the terns of the Treaty and several subsequent Minutes, Mexico's allocation consists of two primary components.2 The first of these, representing close to ninety percent of Mexico's 1.5 maf entitlement, consists of
deliveries at the Northerly International Boundary, arriving at Morelos Dam via
a combination of flows in the main channel of the Colorado River and flows
returned to the River via the Siphon Drop and the Pilot Knob diversions on the
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All-American Canal." 7 These deliveries are composed of water releases from
Lake Mead and the chain of other Lower Basin reservoirs, mixed with agricultural return flows from the Yuma area."8 The second component-the remainder of Mexico's entitlement-consists of deliveries at the Southerly International
Boundary, which occur through the Sanchez Mejorada canal; these flows, which
are highly saline, are primarily composed of agricultural drain water from the
Yuma, Arizona, region."9
The Treaty imposes certain limitations on the relative quantifies of water
2
that the United States can deliver at each location.!
The Treaty's monthly maximum and minimum limits are designed to ensure that the delivery of Mexico's
water is spread throughout the calendar year, rather than being concentrated
only during peak agricultural demand months.2 ' Additionally, these caps accommodate limitations in US delivery infrastructure and provide opportunities
for US users to generate power year-round at various hydropower facilities
downstream of Hoover Dam (including Parker Dan, Davis Dam, Siphon
Drop, and Pilot Knob).'
In addition to giving Mexico a 1.5 maf allocation of the Colorado River, the
1944 Water Treaty called for the construction of various projects associated
with the diversion and use of Mexico's new allocation.' For Mexico, the Treaty
authorized the construction of the Morelos Dam just below the northernmost
point of the limitrophe section, but required IBWC approval and supervision
at Mexico's expense."' The Treaty also identified the United States' Davis Dam
as a storage and diversion structure to facilitate delivery of Mexico's allocation. '"
As such, the 1944 Water Treaty had three primary results: (i) most importantly for Mexico, it apportioned a guaranteed amount of Colorado River
water, essentially a call on the river equal to that of the United States; (ii) it
provided for the construction of Mexico's Morelos Dam, located just below the
northernmost point of the limitrophe, to divert water through the Alamo Canal
for the Mexicali Valley; and (iii) it replaced the IBC with the IBWC and broadened the scope of the IBWC's authority to manage water-related aspects of the
borderlands. A secondary, but perhaps more important effect for Mexico was
that the 1944 Water Treaty established the character and outlook for Mexican

217. Id. art. 11 (c); Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: ManagingEcosystem Conservation in the Colorado Delta, 40 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 819, 829 (2000).
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221. Seeid.
222. See id.; Reclamation,COLO. RIVER WATER USERS ASW'N, http://www.crwua.org/
colorado-river/uses/reclamation (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
223. Id. art. 12.
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development along the international border. By creating a legally secure allocation of water for Mexico, it laid the groundwork for the Mexican govenument
to plan development on the basis of a guaranteed water supply. Prior to the
signing of the Treaty, all development on the Mexican side subsisted on venture
capital and speculation; the outlook for true social development and an equitable distribution of wealth in the region was limited under those conditions." ' As
such, the 1944 Water Treaty in many ways redefined the meaning of the border
for Mexico. "
Importantly, while these treaty provisions established a Mexican water allocation, a means to deliver it for Mexican use, and a binational agency with jurisdiction to settle water disputes, the agreement left important terms and aspects
of water management open to interpretation.2" In particular, the Treaty left at
least three very significant issues unresolved: (i) establishment of definitive water
quality standards for the Mexican allocation; (ii) agreement on the use of

groundwater resources in the border region; and (iii) use of the term "extraordinary drought" to determine circumstances calling for shortage sharing instead
of a clearly defined provision that triggers the countries' reduced water use responsibilities. 30 This final issue ultimately became a primary driver behind Minute 319, as discussed in detail below. 3'
3. Minute 242
The absence of a water quality provision in the 1944 Water Treaty, despite
Mexican requests for such a provision, resurfaced frequently over the ensuing
decades. Although this provision was intentionally omitted-strategically left out
under the misguided presumption that the omission would afford the United
States greater operational flexibility-the ambiguity it created eventually led to a
conflict that would considerably constrain US operations. '
This issue became acute in the 1960s, less than thirty years after Hoover
Dam began filling. In 1963 Congress approved the Colorado River Storage
Project ("CRSP"), which authorized the Glen Canyon Dam. ' After a substantial political battle with environmentalists over construction of a dam at Echo
Park, 34 Reclamation constructed a seven hundred-foot-high impoundment at
Glen Canyon as a cash register dam, intended to produce revenues from hydroelectric power sales to the Southwest and to regulate the Upper Basin's water-delivery requirement to the Lower Basin under the Colorado Compact."
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For the majority of the time that Lake Powell filled behind Glen Canyon Damn,
the United States released only the minimum amount of water that the 1944
Water Treaty required the United States to deliver to Mexico."
The effect of this change in river flows on Mexico brought the dormant
salinity issue to a head. In the decades prior to Glen Canyon, the United States
was delivering ever-increasing quantities of saline wastewater to the lower Colorado River out of the Yuma, Arizona, region-most notably, drain flows from
the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District-and thereby degrading the quality of
water reaching Mexico. ' However, the impact of these wastewater discharges
were substantially masked by the fact that Mexico continued to receive well in
excess of its 1.5 maf Treaty allocation, providing a substantial volume of receiving water to dilute the drain flows." When the gates closed on Glen Canyon,
releases to Mexico were reduced to the Treaty minimums while Lake Powell
filled. As a result, these wastewater deliveries rose to an excess of thirty percent
of the water reaching Mexico under its Treaty allocation: the average annual
salinity of the water Mexico received increased from around 800 parts per million ("ppm") to more than 1,500 ppm. '
This decreased water quality led to significant and immediate declines in
agricultural production in Mexico, damnaging Mexicali Valley faris and precipitating an international crisis that Mexico perceived as both a major security issue and economic threat to Mexicali Valley communities.2 0 In order to counteract the increase in salinity, Mexico embarked on an intensive program of
groundwater pumping that involved drilling a series of new wells along the
US-Mexico border to capture relatively low-salinity groundwater flowing out of
the United States as part of the regional underflow of the Colorado River."' The
United States responded by drilling its own series of wells along the border intended to intercept groundwater flow before it reached Mexico.'2 This pumping war rapidly created a "trough of depression" in the well field, resulting in
adverse groundwater conditions along the border and compounding the effects
of compromised surface flows.'
By 1971, tensions had escalated to the point where Mexico threatened to
bring its case against the United States to the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"). 2," Because the United States' felt pressure from the international com-

Construction,U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR 183-84 (2005), avalable athttp://ww.cr.nps.gov/histosy/
online_books/danss/federaldams.pdf.
236. See PO\VELL, supra note 8, at 223; see also PAUL R. BAUMANN, DROUGH- iN THE
COLORADO RIVER BASIN 10 (2008) (noting that Lake Powell took seventeen years of the River's
entire inflow (presumably except for treaty obligations) to fill).
237. POWELL,supranote 8, at223; see also WARD, supra note 48, at 58, 65.
238. See POWELL, suprma note 8, at 223.
239. See Herbert BrowNvell & Samnuel D. Eaton, The Colorado River Saliity Prohlem with
Mexico, 69 AM.J. INT'L L. 255, 256 (1975). Mexican sources differ in the level of salinity.
240. See general]y VARD, supra note 48, at 44-64.
241. Douglas L. Hayes, The All-Alnerican CanalLhing Project:A Cayst for Rational and
Comprehensive Groundwater Management on the United States-llexico Border, 31 NAT.
R .SOURCESJ.803, 808, 818 (1991).
242. See id.
243. See general/vWARD, supra note 48, at 44-64.
244. Allie Alexis Urnoff, An Analyvsis ofthe 1944 U.S.-Mlexico Water Treaty: Its Past,Present,
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munity and feared Mexico would prevail in the ICJ, Mexico's maneuver prevailed."m After several years of bitter negotiations, Minute 242 finally resolved
the crisis.
Minute 242, signed in 1973, addressed the requirements for water quality
that are absent in the 1944 Water Treaty. " The Minute obligated the United
States to deliver water to Mexico that has "an annual average salinity of no more
than 115 p.p.m. ± 30 p.p.m.... over the annual average salinity of Colorado
' To achieve this
River waters which arrive at Imperial Dam."
result, a substantial portion of saline wastewater from the Yuma region was bypassed via a new
drainage canal (known as the Main Outlet Drain Extension, or "MODE")" to
a remote part of the Delta (a flow that now sustains the Cidnega de Santa Clara
wetland, or "Cidnega").2" These MODE deliveries, which average 105 thousand acre-feet annually, do not count against Mexico's 1944 Water Treaty entitlement or against the entitlements of any US state." ° Rather, these deliveries
operate 'as an ongoing "system deficit," along with other unaccounted-for system
losses on the River, such as Lower Basin reservoir evaporation, phreatophyte
use, illegal diversions, and cancelled water orders that flow on an unscheduled
basis into Mexico.' A provision in Minute 242 that limited the volume of water

that each country could withdraw within five miles of either side of the border

also resolved the groundwater pumping war."
Through this formula, the United States committed itself to providing Mexico water with a salinity that is not substantially worse than the water received by
farmers in the Imperial Irrigation District. Because of the Minute 242 agreement, the United States now carefully regulates wastewater deliveries to the

River above Morelos Dam using a network of computer-controlled groundwater pumps and monitoring gauges to hold salinity levels at the Northerly International Border just below the maximum allowed under the Minute (i.e., 145
ppm more saline than at Imperial Dam). " In practice, this regulation results in
the delivery of water to Mexico at the Northerly International Border with a
salinity of around 850 ppm.
In connection with Minute 242, in 1973 the US Congress appropriated

and Future,32
245.
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$350 million to construct the MODE canal and the Yuma Desalinization Plant
("YDP") as part of a future plan to treat the MODE discharges so that they
could return to the River for delivery to Mexico.' Ultimately, the YDP never
achieved its purpose-it operated for about nine months before shutting down
in 1992-but around 120 thousand acre feet of saline agricultural runoff from
the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District continued to pass through the canal
into the Ci6nega each year. '
Despite its positive outcome, the two countries achieved Minute 242 only
after bitter dispute that left a legacy of hard feelings, particularly on the Mexican
Binational struggles have continued over the salinity issue, with each
side.'
country disputing how salinity should be measured and arguing over conflicting
laboratory results." As US river operations maintain salinity levels at or nearly
at the maximum limit allowable under Minute 242, Mexico's measurements
have not infrequently shown violations of the limit when US measurements
have not. 9
The salinity issue also alerted Colorado River managers to the limitations
of existing international conflict resolution mechanisms under the Law of the
River. Accordingly, Resolution 6 of Minute 242 contains a consultation provision requiring the United States and Mexico to notify and consult with each
other before undertaking border area activities that might have adverse effects
on the other side of the border."' This provision acknowledged the interconnectedness of water resources in the border region, but ultimately fell short of
its ambition by leaving the term "consultation" open to interpretation."' This
ambiguity would come back to haunt US-Mexico relations in future decades.
C. INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES ON THE BORDER
Scholars have widely recognized that social and political developments, as
well as imposing engineering schemes, are significant components of internaThe Colorado River provides a clear example
tional watershed management."
of the role that social and political influences play in river basin management.
255.
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Over the past century, significant developments along the Colorado River, in
the Law of the River, and in US domestic and foreign policy decisions coincided
closely to solidify the international border and create tensions in the US-Mexico
foreign relationship.
Immigration issues provide one exanple of how the social effects surrounding water development implicate the ability to manage the River. Immigration
has long been a defining feature of the border relationship and cannot easily be
disentangled from water management issues, development along the Colorado
River, and related agribusiness ventures in the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys."
The 1922 Colorado Compact-which notably excluded Mexico-was negotiated contemporaneously with comprehensive US immigration reforms in the
1920s." ' These reforms were closely connected to US concerns about an influx
of Mexican immigration resulting from demand for cheap agribusiness labor
and attempts by refugee populations to flee the Mexican Civil War.' Two decades later, the 1944; Water Treaty was driven, at least in part, by US concern
over its international relationship with Mexico mad by the Bracero Program,
which allowed Mexican contract workers to fuel US agribusiness." ' The Mexican salinity crisis, leading to Minute 242, occurred as US concern about a wave
of Mexican immigration resurfaced in the 1970s. 6
As the borderlands grew more crowded, the United States often encountered tension between making the border "more real" by funding border security measures, on the one hand, and preserving a porous boundary to permit
the free flow of labor and trade in order to furnish development of agriculture
and industry along the border, on the other. " ' With major private and public
financial interests firrnly entrenched in the region's water resources and agriculture, the maintenance of a large-scale agricultural labor force has been a primary
driver in border policy. "
The 1920s immigration reforms in the United States-which were driven by
popular fears about Mexican immigration, severe limits on European imnigration, and creation of the US border patrol-nevertheless protected large-scale
agribusiness' interests in migrant labor in the lower Colorado River Basin by
placing no quota on Mexican immigrants 6 and maintaining a de-facto "perneable" border policy that continued into the 1940s."' However, the reforms also
set the stage for future conflict by treating undocumented migrants as fugitives

263.

See Garcia-Acevedo, supra note 63, at 58, 64.

264.
265.

See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
See WARD, supra note 48, at 30-31; Mexican hmnnigrant Labor Histoy, PBS,

http://wwwv.pbs.org/kpbs/dieborder/history/fimeline/I7.htmnl (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
266. See Immigration Act of 1924,43 Stat. 153; see alsoDEAR, supra note 109, at 46; .Mlexican
Iin7igut bor Histoiy supra note 265. For a detailed discussion of how President Roosevelt's
Good Neighbor Policy influenced negotiations on the 1944 Water Treaty wvith Mexico, see
WVARD, supra note 48, and MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES (Lee Stacey ed. 2003).
267. See Francisco Alba, M1evico: A Crucial Crossroads,MIGIATION POL'Y INST. (Feb. 25,
2010), http://wwwv.migrationpolicv.org/article/mexico-cnicial-crossroads.
268. Interview with Torn Romero, Professor, U. Deny. Sturm Coll. of Lav (Nov. 11, 2013).
269. See WARD, supra note 48, at 30-31.
270. See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
271. See Mfexican hnmigrant Lbor -Histon;supra note 265.

Issue I

CETTING TO THE RIGHT SIDE OF M7-E RIVER

in the United States.7 The United States continued to facilitate migrant contract labor through the Bracero Program, the implementation of which addressed a temporary shortage of labor during World War II (and repressed
developing in-migrant labor unions elsewhere in the United States by importing
a mobile, seasonal vorkforce). 73
The Bracero Program ended with another comprehensive US immigration
reform in 1965,7' which led to renewed popular US fears of a wave of Mexican
immigrants in the 1970s, which led to further reforms-continuing a twentieth
century pattern in which the United States grappled on the one hand with the
paradoxical desires of developing water supplies, labor forces, and agricultural
industries, and on the other with maintaining an impenetrable border to prevent
illegal immigration and criminality. 5 Meanwhile, Mexico harbored growing resentnent concerning US influence over the borderlands, as well as the United
States' apparent reluctance to recognize the adversarial connections among economic, social, immigration, and water development policies."'
In keeping with this same pattern, the economic integration of the border
has also driven aggressive binational development of the Colorado River--development that has fueled the very economic success and growth that has, in
turn, driven national imigration concerns. This "[pIronounced interdependence between northern Mexico and the US Southwest is a fact of life, and the
flow of people and products across the international boundary has long affected
population centers near and far beyond the border zone... 7 At the same time,
absent this integration, "it is inconceivable that the region would have become
so attractive to the recent waves of entrepreneurs and immigrants.".7
Irrespective of national policies, the reality of the border is that it remains
closely interconnected politically, economically, culturally, socially, and environmentally, and many local efforts are aimed at promoting more favorable
cross-border interactions. Among many other exanples, California and Baja
California, as well as Arizona and Sonora, have established regional commissions to coordinate matters of mutual concern.17 For several decades, governors
of these states have also met to promote good relations and discuss ways to
influence federal policymaking to better reflect border realities. "'
This local interest in harmonious border relationships has long provided a
powerful countervailing force against national policies that favor separation and
closure at the border, because "the close economic links have made it essential
that the interruptions in the nornal flow of people and trade across the boundary be avoided or at least kept to a minimum."... Local leaders, businesses, and
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managers, "keenly aware of problems of overutilization of scarce resources,
overpopulation, poverty, undocumented migration, and delicate economic interdependence, continue to struggle to prevent serious deterioration of crossborder relations."2 2 Even when a tense national atmosphere prevails at the frontier, residents from both sides recognize the "compelling reasons to preserve a
spirit of neighborly coexistence" -a local consciousness of the importance of
cooperation that, as discussed further below, was also an important feature in
the success of the Minute 319 process.
This tension between national and local interests is a powerful driver in the
border region and drives a great deal of policy action that has damaged border
relationships, economic movement, and border resources." The development
of the Colorado River-and the associated degradation of both border ecosystems and border relationships-has closely reflected this broader issue. As discussed further below, through its active and thoughtful facilitation of Minute
319 and the preceding Joint Colorado River Cooperative Process, the IBWC
implicitly acknowledged the importance of these social issues in sound water
management, and that utilizing the knowledge and experience of local stakeholders to guide central government decisions is key to effectively navigating
these complex border issues.
D. THE FORGOTrEN DELTA

Beginning with the large-scale development of agriculture in the Imperial
and Mexicali Valleys and the Salton Sea disaster in the early 1900s, human impacts began to rapidly transform the Delta."" Under present-day conditions, the
estuaries and marine ecosystems that depended on the Colorado River and its
sediment suffer significantly from both the absence of regular inflow into the
Upper Gulf and substantially diminished water quality. " As a result of upstream dams and diversions, the once vast Delta wetlands dried up all but completely, declining from an estimated two million acres around 1900 to an estimated forty thousand acres of small, scattered wetlands in the 1970s.1 7 The
effects on the Delta's enormous estuary at the head of the Gulf of California
were equally significant, essentially wiping out the once-vibrant fishery the Delta
nounshed and driving native fish and mammals like the totoaba and vaquita
porpoise to the brink of extinction.8
A mere four decades after the completion of the Hoover Damn in 1936,

flows in the Delta became so depleted that scientists and the media declared
the Delta "dewatered" and "dead."8 " Fortunately, the Delta ecosystem proved
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to be far more resilient than many observers predicted. Minute 242 madvertently produced one of the Delta's most significant remaining ecologic resources-the Cirnega de Santa Clara-by providing saline agricultural drain water, bypassed from the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District, to the
Santa Clara Slough." ° This saline water expanded a few isolated wetlands at the
margins of the former Delta into a fifty thousand-acre wetland." Although the
saline bypass water is too toxic for use in agriculture, it has proved to be ideal
for the maintenance of cattail marsh habitat, mimicking the natural brackish
water previously found in the Delta estuary. Today, the Cirnega is the most
important existing wetland in the Delta Region," attrating over 350 migratory
bird species and serving as a key stop on the Pacific Flyway. 3 Several notable
endangered species, including the Yuma Clapper Rail, Desert Pupfish, and
Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, rely on the Cinega's habitat.""' As a testament
to its significance, Mexico included the Cirnega as part of the Mexican Delta's
biosphere reserve."
Subsequent to the emergence of the Ci6nega, a series of flood events temporarily restored flows to the Colorado River Delta's mainstem reaches for
short periods between 1980 and 1993. " In 1983, shortly after Lake Powell
reached full capacity for the first time, the spring runoff was plentiful enough
that overwhelmed Glen Canyon Dam operators installed plywood boards to
keep rising water from over-topping and breaching the Dalnn 7 This began a
period of full reservoirs and significant spring floods that reached the Delta ecosystem from 1983 to 1986; in 1993 a flood on the Gila River again caused a
2
significant quantity of water to reach the ecosystem9.
The result of these flood events was dramnatic: the floodwaters restored an
estimated 150 thousand acres of native habitat that sprang up in the flooded
areas and facilitated substantial rebounds in shellfish populations in the Upper
Gulf.' Although most of this emergent habitat disappeared once dry conditions returned, the Delta's demonstrated ecologic resilience piqued interest in
the scientific and environmental connnunities and prompted local restoration
efforts, spearheaded by the Sonoran Institute and Pronatura Noroeste." In
1997 Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") published a report titled A Delta
Once More, which provided rough estimates of the water required to restore a
minimally-functioning ecosystem, further fueling interest in local Delta restoration efforts."0 '
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In 2000, in response to growing binational interest and advocacy surrounding the Delta, the IBWC issued Minute 306, entitled "Conceptual Framework
for United States-Mexico Studies for Future Recommendations Concerning the
Riparian and Estuarine Ecology of the Limitrophe Section of the Colorado
River and its Associated Delta," ' which acknowledged the health of the Delta
resource as "an issue of bi-national concern .....
Minute 306 established "a
framework for cooperation" through joint scientific studies to "examine the effect of flows on the existing riparian and estuarine ecology of the Colorado River
[below the border[ with a focus on defining the habitat needs of fish, and marine
and wildlife species of concern to each country. " 30'
Following Minute 306, a series of scientific investigations and discussions
took place, including a conservation priority-setting exercise from 2001 to 2004
led by NGOs and academic researchers to identify areas with particular importance to migratory and local birds, terrestrial species, and marine species.'
Through a rigorous evaluative process, respected scientists with extensive research experience and interest in the Colorado River Delta region identified
specific priority areas for environmental protection and restoration in the
Delta.3"
This process culminated in the production of a report entitled "Conservation Priorities in the Colorado River Delta," which was co-published by the Sonoran Institute, EDF, the University of Arizona, Pronatura Noroeste Direcci6n
de Conservaci6n Sonora ("Pronatura Sonora"), Centro de Investigaci6n en Alimentaci6n y Desarrollo, and World Wildlife Fund in 2005."7 The report identified fifteen high-priority conservation sites throughout the Delta (including locations along the Colorado River corridor in the limitrophe and downstream to
the Gulf, the Ci~nega, and various other wetland areas) as priority conservation
areas, and identified the water and restoration needs associated with each of
these sites:"'
Building on the scientific consensus established in the report, Delta restoration efforts centered initially on a high-profile "pilot" restoration program that
created a small network of sites to demonstrate the potential for restoration in
the Delta, together with a broader vision for restoration across the various environments in the Delta."° These restoration efforts largely targeted areas with
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remnant fractions of native vegetation that were threatened by invasive species
that thrive in higher salinity soil,"' and involved mechanically removing invasives
and then working to revegetate affected areas with native tree species."' These
restoration efforts involved long-term coordination among a ,arietq of different
organizations, including Pronatura Noroeste, Sonoran Institute, tie Yuma
Crossing Natural Heritage Area, the Cocopah Indian Tribe, the National Wildlife Federation, IBWC, CILA, US Fish and Wildlife, the Cotnisi6n Nacional
de Areas Naturales Protegidas ("CONANP"), and Reclamation. '
The largest restoration sites emerged along a section of the Colorado River
mainstem just south of the town of Guadalupe Victoria, Baja California.3 The
"Laguna Grande" site, as it is known, now consists of a network of interconnected restoration sites and began successfully demonstrating the restoration of
native cottonwood, willow, and mesquite habitat in 201 L" The binational limitrophe reach of the Delta also received considerable ecological conservation
attention ' and becamne the focus of ongoing binational NGO restoration efforts;3 16 upstream, the City of Yuma also undertook significant restoration work
in the Yuma East Wetlands, which lie at the confluence of the Gila and Colorado Rivers. With twelve miles of the linuitrophe located in the Cocopah Indian
reservation, indigenous restoration efforts have also been important in this region."' Among other efforts, the Cocopah Indian Nation and the National
Wildlife Federation created the Colorado River International Conservation
Area ("CRICA") steering committee to obtain permanent cultural and biological resource protection along the limitrophe and to secure sufficient water flows
for wildlife and habitat protection!"
These local restoration efforts led to the establishnent in 2008 of the Colorado River Delta Water Trust ("Delta Water Trust" or "Water Trust"), a formal water trust created under Mexican law as part of a cooperative project
among Pronatura Noroeste, the Sonoran Institute, and EDF to acquire water
and land assets for specific restoration sites in the Delta. 0 The Delta Water
Trust takes advantage of unique provisions in Mexico's water laws that allow
surface water rights in the Mexicali Valley to be transferred for use in the Delta
ecosystem. 0 The Water Trust subsequently played a significant role in the negotiations between the United States and Mexico by committing to provide water (matching commitments from the United States and Mexico) in support of
310. See LELLOUCH ETAL., supra note 40, at 49.
311. See id.
312. Personal knowledge of the authors.
313. SONORAN INST., COLORADO RIVER DELTA RESTORATION PROJECt: LAGUNA GRANDE
RESTORATION AREA 1 (2013), available athttp://ww.sonoraninsfitute.org/componenVdocnian/
docview/1550-colorado-river-delta-program-restoration-project-laguna-grande-09152013.html.
314. Id.at 1-2.
315. Minute 306, supra note 302.
316. Cocopah's Etorts,supra note 295, at 7-8.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 8.
319. SONORAN INST., COLORAio RIvER DELTA RESTORATION PROJECT: LANDMARK
BINATIONAL AGREEMENT: MINUTE319, atii (2010) availablea4 http://www.sonoraninsfitute.org/

component/docman/docdetails/1552-minute-319-factsheet-09152013.html?Iteinid=3 [hereinafter DELTA WATER TRUST].
320. DELTA WATER TRUST, supra note 319, at i.
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the environmentally related flows in both Minutes 316 and 319, as discussed in
detail below."'
Given the absence of water in the Colorado River's final reaches, Mexico
has not had a significant opportunity to develop recreation-based economic activities in connection with the Colorado River like those that now exist in the
United States." ' In addition to the enormous damage done to the domestic
fishing industry in the Upper Gulf of California-which virtually disappeared in
many areas-the lack of water in the Colorado River has prevented economic
markets in recreation and tourism from developing and expanding. " Where
water is available, however, some ecotourism and recreational opportunities mn
the Delta have developed and have created work opportunities for local residents." ' Campo Mosqueda, a flood-damaged Baja California shrimp farm, has
been transformed into an ecocamp along the Rio Hardy." ' To the east, the
Ci6nega is the Delta's most important wetland ecosystem for maintaining bird
species, and has also attracted recreationalists" ' Even aside from the relatively
recent recreation boom experienced on the Colorado River in the United
States, the Delta continues to have tremendous cultural importance for local
Mexican communities. If the Delta's remaining wetlands "were to disappear,
[local] communities' social fabrics would almost certainly disintegrate ....
.
IV. THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE BORDER WATER RELATIONSHIP
With a few exceptions, the US-Mexico Colorado River water relationship
continued to proceed on a somewhat arms-length basis throughout the latter
part of the twentieth century. Although Minute 306 engendered some limited
optimism regarding the potential for increased cooperation in the.early 2000s,
this was quickly subdued by setbacks that delayed cooperative efforts in the
Delta and further soured the US-Mexico relationship.
These setbacks were closely tied to the growing pressure on Colorado River
resources within the United States in the face of continued growth and an
emerging drought. During the early part of the 2000s, a series of events (including the lining of the Ali-American Canal, the adoption of new reservoir management guidelines in 2001 and 2007, and other developments discussed below) served to illustrate the limited effectiveness of Minute 242's ambiguous
consultation provision,"' and led to ever-increasing tension in the binational relationship.

321. Seeid.
322. See generally SOUTHWICK Assocs., EcoNoMic CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUTDOOR
RECREATION ON THE COLORADO RIVER AND ITS TRIBUTARIES (May 3, 2013), available at

http://protectflows.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Colorado-River-Recreational-EconomicImpacts-Southwick-Associates-5-3-12_2.pdf.
323. Sandra Postel, Revi val in the ColoradoRiver Delta,NAT'L GEOGRAPHIc NEWS WATCH
(Mar. 22, 2013), http://newsiwatch.nafionalgeographic.com/2013/03/22/revival-in-the-coloradoriver-delta/.
324. Id.
325. XVATER MAN, supra note 43, at 279-80; Quienes Somos, CAMPO MOSQUEDA,
http://www.campomosqueda.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
326. See WATERMAN, supra note 43, at 252.
327. LrLLouCH ET AL., supranote 40, at 36.
328. Lochhead, supra note 261, at 384-85.

Issue I

GETITNG TO THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE RIVER

A. THE 2001 INTERIM SURPLUS GUIDELINES
In the late 1990s, under pressure from the US federal government and the
other Colorado River Basin states, California's major Colorado River stakeholders began actively negotiating to reduce California's overall use of Colorado
River water, which had historically exceeded the state's legal allocation of 4.4
maf, through a series of limited reallocations." The product of these negotiations was the 1999 Quantification Settlement Agreement ("QSA"), a conditional settlement agreement among the major California water users signed under heavy pressure from then Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt." °
The QSA' consisted of a series of agreements that collectively amended
the terms of a 1929 agreement" that had allocated Colorado River water among
the major California water users.' The QSA accomplished significant transfers
of water among the major Southern California municipal and agricultural users,
effectively fitting Southern California's historically lower-priority municipal use
within California's legal allocation of 4.4 maf.'
A key condition of the QSA was that the US Department of Interior provide California a "soft landing," meaning limited surplus water deliveries to California would continue for an additional fifteen years to permit the water users
to complete the QSA water transfers.' Reclamation led negotiations among
the Basin states, ultimately releasing a Draft Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") in July 2000 that evaluated, among others, two competing alternatives
submitted by California and by the other Basin States." Although California's
plan was more aggressive in nature, both alternatives proposed to draw down
Colorado River storage reservoirs to provide surplus deliveries to California,
while capturing a far greater percentage of future flood flows."' The Basin States
329. Id.at 354-55.
330. See Tony Perry, 3 Agencies Reach Truce on Colorado River Water, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
5, 1999) http://aricles.lafimes.com/1999/aug/05/news/mn-62828.
331. QUANTIFICATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMEN'T AND RELATED AGREEMENTS AND
DOCUMENTS (Oct. 10, 2003), availableathttp://www.sdcwa.org/sites/default/files/files/QSA-fmal
.pdf [hereinafter QSA].
332. In 1929, to move forward with construction of the Hoover Dan, California's legislature
limited the state's use of Colorado River water to 4.4 maf per year, providing the other basin
states security that Colorado River water would be available to them. California Limitation Act
of 1929, ch. 16, 48 Cal. Stat. 38, 38-39 (1929); see also Lochhead, supra note 261, at 332.
333. See Lochhead, supra note 261, at 380 (providing an excellent discussion on the QSA).
334. See Quantmfication Settlement Agreement, SAN DIEGO CNTY. WATER AUTH.,
http://www.sdcwa.org/quantification-settlement-agreement (last ,isited Oct. 28, 2014).
335. See STAFF OF S. AGRIC. & WATER RES. COMM., 2003-2004 SESS., BILL ANALYSIS ON S.
277 (Cal. 2003), availableathttp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_0251-0300/sb-277_
cfa_20030910_121209_sen comm.html.
336. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM
SURPLUS CRITERIA DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SUMMARY, at S-4 (2000),
availableat http://wwwv.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/surplus1/SURPLUSDEIS.html# (click to view

"Summary").
337. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER
INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ATTACHMENT D
PART 1 (2000), available at http://Nww.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4OO0/surplusl/SURPLUSDEIS.
html# (click to view "Attachment D" and then "Part 1"); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT ATACHMENT D PART 2 (2000) available athttp://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
g4000/surplusl/SURPLUS_DEIS.html# (click to view "Attachment D" and then "Part 2");
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ultimately negotiated a compromise alternative, submitted during the public
comment period on the Draft EIS,' which Reclamation selected in slightly
modified form as the preferred alternative in its Final EIS. ' Following Reclamation's release of the Final EIS, the major California water users approved tie
QSA340 and Secretary Babbitt signed a Record of Decision implementing the
new Colorado River Surplus Guidelines.'
As the Final EIS correctly noted, the changes in water operations contemplated in the Surplus Guidelines-designed to capture a greater percentage of
water generated in high-flow years for use in the United States-would substantially reduce both the frequency and volume of floods and other unplanned
releases of water that had reached Mexico and the Delta periodically since
1980. " ' From an international perspective, the new guidelines thus adopted a
program of Colorado River management that was "heavily prejudiced against
the delivery of excess water to Mexico,"3" and which was apparently antithetical
to Minute 3 0 6's purported interest in the ecology of the Delta. The Final EIS
also rejected a proposal by NGOs (known as the "Pacific Institute proposal")"
that would have guaranteed a small flow of water to preserve existing environmental values in the Delta in connection with the surplus deliveries." This
proposal was rejected on the basis that any environmental impacts in the Delta
were beyond the proper scope of US federal consideration, "6 as Mexico was

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS
CRITERIA DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ATTACHMENT E (2000) available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4OO0/surplusl/SURPLUS _ DEIS.html# (click to view "Attach-

ment E").

338. See Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,531 (Dep't of Interior Aug.
8, 2000).
339. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER
INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, at 2-5, 2-10 (2000),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4OOO/surplus/SURPLUSFEIS.html (click to view
"Description of Alternatives") [hereinafter INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA FEIS].
340. QSA, supra note 331.
341. See Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772, 7772-73 (Dep't of
InteriorJan. 25, 2001).
342. See INERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA FEIS, supranote 339, at 3.16-3.23. The FEIS projected
reductions in flow below the already-depleted Morelos Dam of anywhere between seven percent
to one hundred percent (depending on system hydrology); for all intents and purposes, aside
from occasional flows out of the Gila River (which are not captured by the major Colorado River
reservoirs), the new reservoir operations were projected to effectively eliminate flows below Morelos Darn in dry and normal years.

343. Last Green Lagoon, supra note 73, at 950.
344. See Letter from Mindy Schlimgen-Wilson, Assoc. Dir., Sw. Reg'l Office, American Rivers, et al.,
to David Hayes, Acting Deputy Sec'y of the Interior, and RobertJohnson, Reg'l Director, Bureau of Reclamation (Feb. 15, 2000), reprintedinINTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA FEIS,supra
note 339, at Attachment G. The coalition included American Rivers, Defenders of Wildlife,
Environmental Defense, Friends of Arizona Rivers, Glen Canyon Institute, Grand Canyon Trust,
Land and Water Fund of the Rockies, the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, the Sierra Club, and the Sonoran Institute.
345. Id. A modified version of the proposal was also submitted with regard to the compromise
Basin States alternative. See INTERIM SURPLUS CRIrERIA FEIS, supra note 339, at Attachment

G.
346. See INTERIM

SURPLUS CRITERIA

FEIS,supra note 339, at 3.16.1-3.16.4.
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responsible for the management of all water passing the international boundary" and was therefore in a position to control whether water reached the Delta;
furthermore, Reclamation indicated that it lacked the authority to deliver any
water to Mexico beyond that required by the 1944 Water Treaty."
The position asserted in the 2001 Surplus Guidelines continued a longstanding US policy of disclaiming US federal responsibility for environmental
impacts in Mexico from river operations-a position asserted in Reclamtion's
1996 Biological Assessment, ' Fish & Wildlife's 1997 Biological Opinion," the
ongoing Lower Colorado Multi-Species Habitat Conservation Plan,"' and other
federal actions related to the Colorado River. While the precise scope of transboundary federal environmental obligations remains undecided, the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia later confirmed Reclamation's argument that it lacked discretion to deliver additional water to Mexico under the
1944 Water Treaty and the Law of the River in a 2003 decision, Defenders of
Wildlife v. Norton."
Completed just a year after Minute 306, the 2001 Interim Surplus Guidelines were a significant disappointment to Mexico. From Mexico's perspective,
they represented a unilateral action by the United States that was undertaken
without meaningful input or consultation with Mexico, and served to substantially degrade the US-Mexico water relationship. " The Mexican Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, in a rare formal diplomatic complaint, requested that the US
State Department mitigate impacts of the Surplus Guidelines and suggested that
the action could adversely impact US-Mexico relations.3 "
B. BORDER WATER CONFLICT IN THE WAKE OF THE 2001 GUIDELINES

The Interim Surplus Guidelines also led, at least indirectly, to two other

347.

See id. at 3.16.1.

348.

See id.at 3.16.1-3.16.4; see also COLORADO RIVER
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SUMMARY, supra note

349.

336, at S-1.
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AND LOWER COLORADO MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM (Aug. 1996), available at
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INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY 33, 35 (Apr. 30, 1997), available athttp://www.usbr.gov/lc/regon/g
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351. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, LOWER COLORADO RIVER
MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PLAN 6 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.lcrmscp.gov/
publications/rec of decapr05.pdf.

352.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2003). Defenders

of Wildlife v. Norton involved a challenge to Reclamation's Multi-Species Conservation Program

under the Endangered Species Act, on the basis that Reclamation had failed to consider impacts
in Mexico.
353. Rudy E. Vemer, Short Term Solutions, Interim Surplus Guidelines,and the Future of
the Colorado River Delta, 14 COLO.J. INT'L. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 241, 270 (2003); see David
Getches et al., Immediate Options for Augmenting Water Flows to the Colorado River Delta in
Mexico (May 2001) (unpublished presentation) (on file with University of Colorado Library system).
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significant conflicts between the United States and Mexico: the proposed operation of the YDP and the lining of the All-Amr&ican Canal. Taken together,
these conflicts took the US-Mexico water relationship to new lows during the
mid-2000s.
1. Yuma Desalination Plant
Although the QSA had been approved in principle prior to the Record of
Decision, the QSA remained a tentative agreement at best, and many of the
details began to prove troublesome. 5 Incoming Secretary of the Interior Gale
Norton ultimately imposed a December 31, 2002, deadline for all parties to
sign the QSA"' However, with just hours to go before the deadline, the fragile
consensus around the QSA broke down. 7 In response, Secretary Norton suspended deliveries of surplus water to California, along with a portion of scheduled deliveries to the IID." Several intense rounds of further negotiations ultimately salvaged the QSA; however, Secretary Norton's decision to curtail water
deliveries to California also triggered a key provision related to the continued
bypass of drainage water into the MODE canal pursuant to Minute 242.
The Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act ("CRBSCA"), passed in
connection with Minute 242, authorized the construction of the YDP to treat
MODE drainage water, and thus to minimize the "loss" of bypass water to Mexico." As a temporary measure, however, CRBSCA also provided for the bypass water to be offset during an interim period via pledges of water conserved
by federal efforts to line the Coachella Canal in California.' The curtailment
of deliveries to California under the QSA resulted in the loss of this offset water
under the terms of the lining agreement, which required the Department of the
Interior to begin exploring new alternatives to replace the bypass flow, including
potential operation of the YDP. '
Reopening the YDP, which had only operated for two brief periods since
its completion in 1992,"' posed a significant threat to the continued existence of
the Ci6nega wetland, as it would have cut MODE flow to the Ci~nega and replaced it with highly saline brine waste discharge from desalination operations.
Scientific studies demonstrated that this would likely drive salinity levels high
enough to destroy most of the enormous cattail marsh that had developed in

355. Lochhead, supranote 261, at 355-56.
356. Dean E. Murphy, Southern California Water Officials Race Deadlne,N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
31, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/31/nafional/31WATE.html.
357. Water Salton Sea: Colorado River. Hearingon SB. 654 Before the S. Agnic. & Res.
Comm., 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at http://www'.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0304/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb 654 cfa_20030910_120952_sen conmm.html.
358. Id.
359. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266 (1974).
360. Id.§ 102(a).
361. See David Steffen, Water Agencies Revive Long-Donmant Yuma Desalting Plani;
IMPERIAL VALLEY PRESS (April 29, 2010), http://articles.ivpressonline.com2010-04-29/
desalinated-water_24805781.
362. Yuma Desalting Plant U.S. BUREAU OF REcLAMATION, http://wv.usbr.gov/lc/yuma/
facilities/ydp/yaoydp.htnl (last updated Apr. 4, 2014).
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the northern portion of the Ci~nega"' Many water users advocated for operation of the YDP, which led to repeated clashes between Reclamation, Lower
Basin water users, environmental organizations, Mexican water managers, and
Mexican environmental agencies that further disrupted the diplomatic relationship during the mid-2000s."4
2. Lining the All-American Canal
The US-Mexico relationship only deteriorated further in response to another QSA-related contxoversy: the lining of the All-American Canal
("AAC").' A key feature of the QSA was the conservation (and transfer) of
around seventy thousand acre-feet of seepage losses from a twenty-three-mile
stretch of the unlined AAC as it passes through the sandy soils of the Algodones
region along the US-Mexico border."' In 1988 the San Luis Rey Indian Water
Rights Settlement Act authorized Reclamation to line the AACY" Reclamation
ultimately issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Report ("FEIS/EIR") and corresponding Record of Decision in 1994, selecting the so-called "Parallel Canal Alternative," which involved constructing a
new concrete-lined canal parallel to the existing one."
The FEIS/EIR estimated that the lining project would cut seepage from the
AAC by approximately seventy-five percent."
At the time, approximately
ninety percent of this seepage flowed towards Mexico, where it served to replenish groundwater in the northern Mexicali Valley with relatively low-salinity

363. See Researchers Study Effect of Yuma Desalong Plant on Cinega de Santa Clara,
REDORBIT (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/1856537/researchersstudyeffect ofyuma desahingplant on-cienega de/; see BALANCING WATER NEEDS ON THE
LOwER COLORADO RIVER: RECOMMENDATIONS OFTHEYUMA DESALTING PLANT/CIINEGA DE
SANTA CLARA WORKSHOP 7 (Apr. 22, 2005), availableathttp://cwcbweblink.state.co.us/
WebLinkDocView.aspxid-114241&page=6&dbid=0; but see YUMA DESALTING PLANT
DEMONSTRATION RUN REPORT, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 27

(Dec. 2008), availableathttp://www.usbr.gov/lc/yuna/facilifies/ydp/YDPdenrunO7.pdf.
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PROPOSED SOLUTION 24 (Sept./Oct. 2005), availableathttp://wv.swhydro.arizona.edu/archive/
V4_N5/feature6.pdf.
365. Osvel Hinojosa-Huerta et al.,
Andrade Mesa Wetlands of the All-Aineican Canal,42
NAT. RE.J. 899, 909-10 (2002) [hereinafter Andrade Mesa Wetlands]; Letter from Peter V.
Culp et al., to Gale Norton, Sec'y of the Interior, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, et al. (June 14, 2005)
(on file with author); Follow-up Letter from Kara Gillon, Defenders of Wildlife, et al., to Gale
Norton, Sec'y of the Interior, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, et al. (Aug. 9, 2005) (on file with author).
366. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ALL-AMERICAN CANAL LINING
PROJECT

FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/FINAL ENVIRONMENT'AL IMPACT

REPORT, at S-5 (1994), available at http://",ww.iid.comiModules/SliowDocurment.aspxdocumnentid-2272 [hereinafter AAC FEIS]; FRANCISCO ZAMORA ARROYO ET AL., SONORAN INST.,
PRONATURA SONORA, ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND MITIGATION
ALTERNATIVES IN MEXICO OF THE LINING OF THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL, SUMMARY REPORT

(2005); Francisco Zamora Arroyo, Peter Culp & Osvel Hinojosa-Huerta, Look)ig Beyond the
Border:EnvirorunentalConsequences of the All-American CanalProjectinMexico and Potential BinationalSolutions, in FRONTERA NORTE, THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL LINING DISPUTE:
AN AMERICAN RESOLUTION OVER MEXIcAN GROUNDWATER RIGHTS? 21, 32 (2009).

367. San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-675, 102
Star. 4000, 40006.
368. See AAC FEIS, supra note 366.
369. See id.
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water."' Lining of the canal was thus expected to significantly reduce groundwater recharge to the aquifer in the region and to lower the water table by as
much as thirty feet in the northeastern portion of the Mexicali Valley, where
Mexican farmers had come to rely on AAC seepage in support of their groundwater pumping." ' Reclamation did not consider impacts to Mexican wetlands
in the FEIS/EIR, although studies also suggested that the canal lining project
was likely to impact approximately 8,400 acres of wetlands and terrestrial habitat
along the Andrade Mesa in Mexico."'
As noted above, the 1944 Water Treaty did not address the use of groundwater in the border region, and aside from the limited provisions of Minute 242
there had been no other broad binational agreement on the sharing of border
aquifers. "' Although IBWC held a consultation with CILA in the early stages
of the AAC lining project (thus satisfying the requirements of Resolution 6 of
Minute 242)," ' the alternative adopted in the federal Record of Decision did
not attempt to address the related groundwater concerns, nor did the consultation recognize or address potential wetland impacts.
In the absence of a binational groundwater agreement, the formal US position was that the AAC seepage was legally part of California's 4.4 maf water
allotment under the Law of the River, such that Mexico had no legal right to the
water,' 5 nor did Mexico have the right to interfere with efficient use of water
within US territory. 7 Reclamation conducted two five-year re-examinations of
the 1994 NEPA documentation without making changes or obtaining further
consultation, and Mexico maintained open opposition to the proposed project
throughout. Then President of Mexico Felipe Calder6n publicly opposed the
project, stating that it would "cause enorous damage to the economy and the
environment of the Baja California border."7 .
Mexican interests ultimately joined several organizations in California in a
7 In 2006, however, Congress overrode these
federal lawsuit against the project."
legal challenges, issuing an instruction that Reclamation proceed with the project regardless of any conflicting environmental laws." Despite further Mexican
protests, Reclamation commenced and completed the lining project in 2009,
freeing up water for transfer to San Diego. " This action by the United States,
370. See id.
371. See id.
372. Andrade Mesa Wetlands, supra note 365, at 907-10.

supra note 47, at 4-6 (2013).
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376.
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1167 (9th Cir. 2007).
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which Mexico again perceived as an essentially unilateral move to develop border water resources, " drove the US-Mexico border water relationship to a new
low and provided an excellent example of the resentment that the continued,
arms-length water management relationship could generate."
C. THE 2007 INTERIM SHORTAGE GUIDELINES

By the mid-2000s the Colorado River Basin was experiencing the worst
drought in its roughly one hundred-year recorded history,' a drought that continues as of the writing of this article and which by now is recognized to be
among the most significant in the past several thousand years of reconstructed
flow.'" With "no specific guidelines to address the operations of Lake Powell
and Lake Mead during drought and low reservoir conditions," Reclamation
needed to devise a management plan that would provide more certainty to
stakeholders. " After some initial attempts at discussions among the Basin
States, Reclamation initiated a NEPA process to generate and consider alternafives for reservoir management."0
In late 2007, following an extensive series of negotiations among the Colorado River Basin States and other US stakeholders, then Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne signed off on a decision to implement the Colorado
River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead ("2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines").0
The 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines, as well as the series of agreements
amrong the Basin States and the major Colorado River users that accompanied
them, for the first time in the history of the Law of the River established criteria
for delivery of Colorado River water during periods of water shortage.' Secretary Kempthorne described the 2007 accord as "the most important agreement
among the seven basin states since the original Colorado River Compact of
1922," " and praised the Basin States for working together to solve the shortage
issues on the river within the confines of the Law of the River.90
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The 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines created operational flexibility by coordinating the drawdown of Lakes Powell and Mead during clearly defined periods of shortage, "' and created specific trigger points, based on reservoir elevation levels at Lake Mead, to determine when Lower Basin users would incur
shortages."' These trigger points, together with elevations at Lake Powell, determined release amounts from Powell to Mead. 9' Previously, under the "Colorado River Long Range Operating Criteria" (developed by the Secretary of the
Interior pursuant to the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act), the annual
target release at Glen Canyon Dam was 8.23 maf9 2 -a figure that the Secretary
would only alter under "surplus" or flood conditions justifying larger water releases for the Lower Basin.' The 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines allowed a
wider range of releases based on the relative condition of storage in Lakes Powell and Mead, facilitating conjunctive operation of the reservoirs that allowed
them to function more like a single, large reservoir. Furthermore, they provided
greater certainty, flexibility, and predictability in the event of prolonged drought
conditions."'
Introduced into the Law of the River in the 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines was a new management mechanism known as Intentionally Created Surplus ("ICS")."' The ICS mechanism allows Lower Basin water users to store
water in Lake Mead created through extraordinary conservation measures,398
system efficiency improvements, or importation and subsequent recovery in fu-

ture years."9 ' In exchange for foregoing a portion of its annual apportionment
in the year that the extraordinary conservation occurs, a user that conserves water may receive delivery of water in excess of its annual apportionment in future
years (or transfer that excess water for use by another user in the sane state).
Alternatively, non-Colorado River water imported to the Basin can then be diverted at another location, allowing a user that augments the River to receive
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water in excess of its normal apportionment."°
Perhaps most importantly, for a river basin with a long history of interstate
conflict the agreements surrounding the Interim Guidelines represented a major step towards basin-wide collaboration and the sharing of risks amongst the
US Basin States and the major water delivery agencies in the United States." '
These agreements worked around the Basin stakeholders' deeply conflicting
legal interpretations of the Colorado River Compact and other elements of the
Law of the River, and bound the Basin States to address future dilemmas
00
through consultation and negotiation before initiating any litigation."
The Guidelines also reflected a changing posture between US water users
and the major environmental NGOs, who collaborated closely with other US
stakeholders and the Bureau of Reclamation in the development of the Guidelines, reversing a long history of arms-length, litigation-driven relationships between environmental and water user interests. As a result, NGOs developed
one of the alternatives considered in the Draft and Final EIS documents and
provided significant input into the policies ultimately adopted in the Interim
Shortage Guidelines. Many of the concepts proposed by the NGOs survived
in some form in the final preferred alternative adopted by Reclamnation."
As a result, the Final FAvironmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Interim Guidelines included a proposal submitted by NGOs tided "Taking ICS
to Mexico," which proposed the extension of the ICS program to Mexico as a
means of addressing a series of critical binational water management issues, including conservation of the Colorado River Delta ecosystem."' The seven Basin States also provided a statement of support for opening the use of the ICS
mechanism to Mexico as part of a broader binational water management package. ' In a letter to Secretary Kempthorne, the Basin States encouraged future
discussions with Mexico regarding Colorado River management issues, noting
that during "the course of [2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines] negotiations no
issue [I surpassed the importance of how the United States exercises its authority to reduce the quantity of water allotted to Mexico under Article 10(a) of the
Mexican Water Treaty of 1944. " "o In other words, the Basin States recognized
that the conflicting potential interpretations of the vague "extraordinary
drought" language in the 1944 Water Treaty continued to generate unnecessary
uncertainty and to undemiine efforts to operate the system more flexibly in the
face of drought." '
400. Essentially, this mechanism takes advantage of Articles II(B)(2) and (6) of the Ariona v
C~ailbrni; Consolidated Decree. Article II(B)(2) allocates any surplus above 7.5 maf as follows:
fifty percent to CA, forty-six percent to AZ, Four percent to NV, while Article LI(B)(6) allows the
Interior Secretary to allocate water unused in one state to another state. See Arizona v. California,
547 U.S. 150, 155 (2006). To enable the mechanism, the Lower Basin states and water suppliers
agreed to waive their usual surplus rights under Article 11(B) (2) of the Decree in order to allow
the Secretary to manage conserved water as ICS. See ICF Agreement, supranote 398, art. 3.
401. Kempthorne Press Release, supranote 387; Basin States' Letter, sutpra note 230, at 1.
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406. Id. at 3.
407. Id.; 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 29, art. 9(f).

VA TER LA V1V
REVIEW

Volume 18

At the same time, NGO interests were growing increasingly concerned
about the need to address issues related to the Colorado River Delta-issues
that NGO representatives believed stakeholders could effectively address only
in the context of a broader binational water management discussion. " This
discussion seemed unlikely to materialize through formal diplomatic channels.
Symbolically, the "Taking ICS to Mexico" proposal and the Basin States' letter
represented a step away from the tendencies towards unilateralism and conflict
over the past several decades, and indicated a growing desire among US stakeholders to engage Mexico in productive binational discussions.

V. THE ROAD TO MINUTE 319
As discussions surrounding the 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines proceeded, IBWC and CILA began limited discussions regarding Mexican participation in Colorado River shortages (at the urging of US stakeholders)." However, Mexico strongly objected to its exclusion from the extensive discussions
surrounding the 2007 Guidelines, taking particular issue with the inclusion of
presumed shortage volumes to Mexico as part of Lower Basin shortage management in the modeling work that supported the Draft and Final EIS documents."' These modeling assumptions allocated Mexico approximately seventeen percent of any US Lower Basin shortage amount, in keeping with the
preferred US interpretation of the Treaty's "extraordinary drought" provision.'
In response to the Draft EIS for the Shortage Guidelines, CILA insisted that
Mexico should be part of discussions about the sustainable use of water in the
Colorado River Basin and should be a proportional beneficiary of any conservation programs that modified water availability. ' In these comments, CILA
referenced salinity issues, surplus deliveries, environmental flows, and interpretation of the 1944 Water Treaty provisions with regard to "extraordinary
drought" as important issues to Mexico."'
Mexico's objections to the 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines reflected a
substantial concern over how to manage shortages within its domestic framework."' On the US side, institutions like the Arizona Water Bank, the newly
developed reservoir storage rules in the 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines, and
other mechanisms had allowed users in the United States to prepare for and
mitigate against shortage impacts. By contrast, Mexico has no storage reservoirs
of its om and effectively lacks meaningful domestic on- or off-stream storage
options. This leaves Mexico heavily dependent on scheduled deliveries of wa-
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ter from US reservoirs to meet its domestic water needs for municipal, agricultural, and environmental uses."' As a result, any shortage would directly impact
Mexican water users in a manner that Mexico could not control or mitigate.
Like the major US municipal users, Mexico's urban -areas in Tijuana, Ensenada, and other coastal communities in both Baja and Sonora also faced substantial water management challenges related to growing urban demand; although desalinization plants were under serious consideration as a solution, the
high infrastructure cost posed challenges for Mexican communities." Groundwater overdraft was also a growing concern for agricultural users in the Mexicali
Valley, exacerbated by the lining of the All-American Canal. At the same time,
system efficiency improvements in the United States, including the 2001 Interim Surplus Guidelines and a new project proposed as part of the 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines to capture over-deliveries to Mexico,"' were decreasing the quantity of river flow to Mexico. Additionally, salinity levels were
creating economic impacts on Mexican farms, presenting a significant obstacle
to efficiency improvements in agriculture due to problems with salt buildup on
cultivated lands. "' And not least among Mexican concerns were the significant
and growing environmental issues related to the Colorado River Delta.
A. THEJOINT COLORADO RIVER COOPERATIVE PROCESS
Given the already strained nature of the US-Mexico relationship on the
River, it seemed unlikely to many stakeholders that IBWC and CILA would be
able to constructively address this growing suite of binational issues through regular channels.' Instead, a small group of US Lower Basin and Mexican water
managers, as well as NGOs from both countries, began exploring the potential
for a less formal binational process that would bring together water managers
and stakeholders from both nations to seek out and explore new binational water management solutions.'" To this end, Pronatura Noroeste, a Mexican environmental group, organized a series of informal binational workshops to explore potential cooperative binational actions for improving Colorado River
management in areas related to growth, shortages, and environmental needs.'2 '
The driving force behind these workshops was a mutual desire to move beyond
the notion that international river management was necessarily a zero-sum
ganme, in which the interests of one country or one water user would prevail over
the interests of others-an approach which had repeatedly proved to encourage
conflict mad legalistic,
ams-length relationships between water users in the Col2
orado River Basin.1
In a series of workshop discussions, this small group of US and Mexican
stakeholders identified the need for a new Minute that would provide a holistic
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and broadly-based framework for binational water management, together with
a series of potential areas of cooperation, all in connection with basic needs
related to efficiency, conservation, augmentation and environmental stewardship. ' The workshops also proposed a process of binational information exchange about Colorado River operations and water management, including several field trips to build shared understanding. 4 Around this same time, a group
of US municipal users also began exploring the potential for specific binational
projects that they could undertake in cooperation with their Mexican counterparts, including a potential joint desalinization facility. 5
In response to these stakeholder efforts and the growing interest in a joint
collaborative process, US and Mexican officials began a series of conversations
about the potential for a formal binational collaborative process under the auspices of IBWC and CILA." On August 13, 2007, the countries released the
US-Mexico Joint Statement on Colorado River Cooperative Actions ("2007
Joint Statement"), in which the participants of the prior informal workshops
established a framework for "discussion, joint study, investigation and evaluation".. and agreed that "cooperative, innovative and holistic measures should
be considered to ensure that the Colorado River is able to continue to meet
environmental, agricultural and urban demands of both nations .....
The water
management issues prioritized in these discussions were: (i) climate change and
the ongoing effects of historic drought in the basin; (ii) the Colorado River
Delta, habitat protection, and other environmental priorities; (iii) water conservation, storage, and augmentation, including desalinization opportunities; and
(iv) the
identification of opportunities for more efficient water deliveries to Mexico. '
On March 11, 2008, a binational Core Group established in accordance
with the 2007 Joint Statement convened with the purpose of establishing an
international group of representatives to identify salient issues and ultimately
develop implementation strategies." Known as the Joint Colorado River Cooperative Process'("JCRCP"), the IBWC and CILA Commissioners formalized
the process in an exchange of letters ' and a joint "Terms of Reference."
The Core Group operated under the auspices of the IBWC, but the group
423.
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focused more on the inclusion of local stakeholder interests than a typical diplomatic decision-making body. The Core Group consisted of individuals representing federal agencies, state agencies, municipal and agricultural water providers, and NGO stakeholders from both countries.' Additionally, for the first
time outside of Minute 306, the IBWC emphasized the importance of environmental water use along with urban and agricultural use.' The Core Group
ultimately created four Work Groups to pursue cooperative actions in four
broad areas: (i) conservation, (ii) new water sources, (iii) environmental issues,
and (iv) system operations.3 ' These Work Groups, closely reflecting the 2007
Joint Statement's selected focus areas, met during 2008, 2009, and 2010 to
sketch out potential actions both nations could take in these respective areas,
later reporting their findings back to the binational Core Group.'
From the perspective of the authors, two of whom were participants in the
JCRCP discussions, the process of trust-building, mutual understanding, and
stakeholder empowerment that occurred through the binational process was
critical to the future success of these efforts. 6 When theJCRCP began, US and
Mexican stakeholders began in very different places-the United States with a
series of principles, the Mexican side with a long list of potential binational projects. Discussions were long and often difficult due to the significant levels of
historic mistrust. Cultural differences made the free flow of communication
challenging, language barriers made communication between the United States
and Mexican participants cumbersome and led to frequent misunderstandings,
and progress towards consensus was at times frustratingly slow. However,
through field trips, conversations, and many evenings of shared meals, cerveza,
and good company, binational stakeholders built increasing trust, mutual understanding, and ultimately friendships that made communication and consensus possible. -In many cases, these relationships built on the existing network of
relationships that NGOs and other individuals with experience working across
the border had developed by facilitating communications, proposing solutions,
and smoothing over misunderstandings.'
B. THE FIRST BREAKTHROUGH: MINUTES 316,317, AND 318

After more than three years of effort in the JCRCP, the two sides built an
increasingly robust understanding of the interests and values of the other, and
each of the various Work Groups developed a series of consensus-based reconmendations for consideration as part of a larger agreement. In early 2009
IBWC and CILA issued another joint declaration ("2009 Joint Declaration")
to solidify the progress made by the Joint Colorado River Cooperative process
on developing cooperative measures for water management.'' The 2009 Joint
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Declaration recognized the importance of "representatives from governmental
and non-governmuental organizations in the United States and Mexico [whol devoted significant effort, particularly over the past two years through the IBWC,
to this initiative in order to identify, discuss, and prioritize potential actions for
implementation through cooperative efforts to provide additional security and
certainty in the water supply of the Colorado River System.""9 The 2009 Joint
Declaration presaged three important new agreements reached during 2009
and 2010 that paved the way to the comprehensive agreement reached in Minute 319.
1. Minute 316: Hope for the Cidnega de Santa Clara
The first substantive result of the JCRCP process developed with regard to
the long-standing dispute over the Ci6nega de Santa Clara wetland in Mexico,
which as noted above was threatened by the proposed operation of the YDP."
Rather than allow this issue to disrupt the binational goodwill developing
through the JCRCP, Reclamation used the JCRCP process to engage Mexico
with regard to a proposed YDP pilot run." These consultations took place in
November 2008 and July 2009 mad included extensive discussions with the
JCRCP stakeholders, culminating in an IBWC joint report offering recommendations for a pilot run to determine the feasibility of long-term operations. "
Pursuant to this report, in early 2010 the IBWC adopted Minute 316, which
established ajoint program for mitigation of potential impacts to the Ci6nega."
The United States, Mexico, and participating NGOs each pledged to deliver
ten thousand acre-feet of water to the Ci(nega to replace the water that would
not flow through the MODE bypass canal during the test operation of the
YDP,"' while most of the costs of YDP operation were borne by MWD,
SNWA, and CAWCD under a joint funding agreement. ....
Minute 316 became the first binational agreement to provide water for the
specific purpose of preserving the Colorado River Delta ecosystem. It was also
a milestone for the Delta Water Trust, which was the mechanism NGOs employed to match joint federal commitments to the Delta.' Between 2009 and
2010 the Delta Water Trust facilitated the delivery of approximately ten thousand acre-feet of water to the Citnega in support of Minute 316.'" Working
with two Mexican agencies, the Trust temporarily pledged its water rights to
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CONAGUA for their stated purpose, and CILA arranged for their delivery to
the Ci~nega via the MODE canal in lieu of their regular delivery as part of Mexico's regular annual water order at Morelos Dam." This successful three-way
pledge of water among the federal governments and NGOs also carried forward
as a strategy for future environmental flows, providing the basic structure for the
Minute 319 environmental flows that followed.
Reclamation declared the 328-day YDP pilot run a success. " During the
pilot run, YDP produced 30,496 acre-feet of water, which Reclamation delivered to the Colorado River as part of the Mexican allocation in exchange for
water remaining in Lake Mead, which it credited to the funding parties. However, the most remarkable aspect of YDP's pilot run was the advancement of
cooperation among the United States, Mexico, US water users, and environmental groups. Not only did the consultative planning under Minute 316 affirm
the emerging commitment to enhanced binational cooperation and alleviate
Mexico's concerns over potential adverse impacts to the Ci~nega, but the
once-controversial pilot operation also moved forward without a single lawsuit
and with the affirmative support of environmental organizations-a remarkable
departure from the bitter acrimony of previous years.
2. Minute 317: Formalizing the Stakeholder Process
Minute 317, executed in June 2010, formalized the ongoing JCRCP and
reaffirmed IBWC and CILA's commitment to an inclusive stakeholder process
as they continued to work towards a cooperative and comprehensive agreement
on Colorado River management. ' Minute 317 also symbolically reaffirmed the
commitment to the binational process on both sides in the wake of a shared
tragedy. On September 15, 2008, the US Commissioner of the IBWC, Carlos
Main, and the Mexican Commissioner of CILA, Arturo Henera, perished together when their plane crashed as they travelled to meet local Mexican officials
to assess flood conditions on the Rio Grande River." The tragic deaths of the
leaders of the process halted discussions for months and easily could have derailed furtherJCRCP discussions. Instead, after the two sides recovered from
the tragedy, they rallied around the newly appointed leadership of IBWC and
CILA, unified in their resolve to continue the Commissioners' work.
As part of the continued breakaway from the traditional nation-to-nation
structure for international diplomacy, Minute 317 acknowledged the effectiveness of the stakeholder-driven Core Group/Work Group JCRCP process in
developing solutions." Referencing both the consultation provision of Minute
242 (despite its shortcomings) and the Minute 306 framework for cooperation
in joint efforts to ecologically benefit the Colorado River Delta," Minute 317
448.
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coalesced these previous consultation efforts into this new, more comprehensive approach and effectively institutionalized the Core Group/Workgroup
structure for the ongoing evaluation and discussion of binational cooperative
actions." Minute 317 also took the additional step of creating a binational Consultative Council17 that gave the US Basin States' representatives and their Mexican counterparts standing in the international process, with the ability to review
the actions and recommendations of the Core Group. This new institutional
mechanism would prove to be critical as negotiations proceeded, as it helped to
assure stakeholders that IBWC and CILA would take their interests and water
rights into consideration. Although this clearly complicated discussions by
bringing domestic issues into the binational conversation, it also allowed the two
countries to consider far more significant changes to the binational framework
of river management.
3. Minute 318: Cooperation in the Face of Crisis
By early 2010 the essential elements of a comprehensive agreement had
begun to emerge out of continuing binational discussions, including: (i) Mexican
use of US reservoir storage via a mechanism similar to ICS; (ii)mechanisms to
creatively manage salinity impacts resulting from such storage; (iii) sharing of
shortage risks; (iv) a series of potential binational conservation and augmentation projects; and (v) the provision of environmental flows and restoration actions in the Colorado River Delta." Nonetheless, a great deal of work remained
to determine how those potential solutions could fit together in a comprehensive agreement that would work forboth sides, and a clear path forward had not
yet been identified.
Having only just recovered from the tragic loss of the IBWC Commissioners, the binational discussions suffered what seemed like another substantial
setback when a destructive earthquake struck the Mexicali Valley on April 4,
2010, damaging much of Mexico's water delivery infrastructure. 9 The 7.2 magnitude earthquake caused severe damage to primary and secondary canals,
roads, and related agricultural infrastructure, severely impacting more than
eighty thousand acres of farmland and causing significant damage to approximately seventy thousand additional acres (altogether approximately 230 square
miles)."a The earthquake was so severe that it also significantly altered the topography of the lower reaches of the Colorado River, changing land elevations
throughout the river corridor, and creating new lagoons and other features near
the historic estuary." '
The severe damage left many Mexicali Valley farmers cut off from water
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supplies altogether, causing significant crop failures throughout the Valley. '
Moreover, with major portions of the Mexicali Irrigation District cut off because
of damaged canals, Mexico would have been unable to use all of its annual
allocation of water from the Colorado River.4" However, a concept that had
been percolating in the ongoing binational discussions offered a potential solution. Building from the "Taking ICS to Mexico" concept that the NGOs advanced in the 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines, the ongoing binational discussions featured a similar proposed mechanism known as "Intentionally Created
Mexican Allocation" ("ICMA"), which would allow Mexico to conserve water
and store a portion of its annual 1.5 maf Treaty allocation in Lake Mead for
delivery in a future year.4"
Although this mechanism was originally developed with the idea that it
would be an integral part of a more comprehensive solution, the humanitarian
catastrophe in Mexico became the impetus for both sides to immediately authorize its use in order to allow Mexico to store some of its 2010 water allocation
This
in Lake Mead until damaged water infrastructure could be repaired.'
request led to the adoption of Minute 318 on December 17, 2010, which allowed Mexico to defer treaty deliveries from 2010 to 2013 for recovery in a
future year.4" Although the emergency delayed negotiations over the remaining
elements of a comprehensive agreement for nearly a year, the success of Minute
318 also helped to build stakeholder confidence in the ICMA mechanism and
created an existing volume of Mexican storage that proved critical for Minute
319. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the successful binational response
to the earthquake built additional goodwill and trust between the two sides and
helped provide the catalyst for real progress in more comprehensive binational
Colorado River discussions."'
C. REACHING COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT: MINUTE 319
Beginning in early 2011, discussions recommenced among Reclamation,
the Basin States, US water agencies, NGOs, the IBWC, CILA, Mexico,
CONAGUA, and other Mexican stakeholders in search of a comprehensive,
Throughout 2011, both sides worked to develop procohesive agreement.
posals on various specific elements of a framework agreement and met frequently to present their ideas and discuss specific modeling outcomes of different regimes for shortage sharing, reservoir storage, and surplus sharing. 9
Although progress was slow, the ongoing process of information exchange was
important in building an understanding of the management challenges, operations, and infrastructure on both sides of the border.
Perhaps most significantly, this included Reclamation and CONAGUA
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reaching a mutual understanding and agreement on the assumptions, methodologies, and limitations of the Colorado River system models that were used to
evaluate the results of different binational water management regimes, including
storage, surplus, and shortage sharing proposals.47 This seemingly technical
concern was in fact critical to the negotiations, since both sides used these models as tools to evaluate the distribution of potential benefits and burdens (and
thus the relative fairness) of different water management proposals.
At the outset of the JCRCP process, there was very little common understanding of the water infrastructure and allocation rules that drove operations
and management decisions in the two countries. For example, Mexico had
relatively little experience with Reclamation's Riverware-based Colorado River
Support System ("CRSS") model, which drives decisions in the United States."'
To evaluate options for Colorado River system management, Mexico had instead built its own independent model of the Colorado River system, running
on a different software platform."' With different assumptions, data sets, and
inherent limitations, as well as limited understanding of each other's infrastructure and rules, these critical decision support models would produce inconsistent or even contrary results when evaluating the same proposed approach to
system management. This made progress in negotiations over mutually acceptable system operating rules extraordinarily difficult."' However, through a
series of technical exchanges and training sessions, Reclamation and
CONAGUA reached a mutual understanding and agreement on the modeling
approach, allowing Mexican technicians to independently operate the CRSS
model to explore their own management concepts and verify the results of Reclamation's work."' This technical agreement allowed both sides, finally, to proceed on a common factual footing.
By early 2012 both sides were under increasing pressure to reach agreement, but still had not reached consensus on a comprehensive framework. The
parties evaluated and discussed dozens of different ideas and proposals, but
given the competing interests and complex interrelationships between them no
single proposal or idea could move forward in isolation. Only a comprehensive
package would provide an appropriate and equitable balance of interests and
objectives. For example, shortage sharing tied to reservoir elevations in Lake
Mead-a critical element of any agreement for the United States, but understandably controversial in Mexico-would clearly need to be linked to agreements on a number of issues. These interrelated issues included surplus sharing, increased operational transparency, joint projects to conserve water,
environmental restoration and flows, the availability of a reservoir storage mechanism, agreements on salinity and shortage sharing, and so forth."' To try to
work through these complex interconnections, the United States and Mexico
elected to exchange "best-effort" comprehensive proposals, in which each side
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attempted to present what they felt would be a fair, complete agreement.476
To achieve this, each side appointed a small group of key individuals and
stakeholders'" to develop proposals. While the initial exchange of proposals
showed few places where the two sides were actually in agreement, it did demonstrate consensus on the essential elements of a future agreement-shortage mad
surplus sharing, reservoir storage, binational conservation projects, salinity, and
environmental flows-helping each side understand the nature of the interconnections that the other had drawn between those elements."' This exchange of
proposals also highlighted important misunderstandings that continued to persist and that stemmed in part from the two sides essentially talking past each
other, as well as key translation errors that had occurred in moving drafts between English and Spanish.' 9
Working from these conflicting proposals, the two sides continued to work
on a mutually agreeable comprehensive framework in a series of meetings involving (i) key stakeholders,' (ii) appointed small groups that reported back to
the key stakeholders," and finally (iii) an even smaller group that hashed out
the final details and drafted a proposed agreement. Drafted simultaneously in
both English and Spanish, with each draft projected onto matching large screens
to ensure consistency and avoid further misunderstandings, the two sides
reached a breakthrough on a draft Minute, and got to work on the bevy of supporting funding agreements, forbearance agreements, and other documents
necessary to implement the Minute on each side of the border."7 This included
a notable domestic agreement among Reclamation, IBWC, the seven Colorado
River Basin States, and several key water suppliers in which federal and non-federal parties alike confirmed their mutual agreement to cooperate and coordinate as necessary to carry out the terms of Minute 319.' Additionally, IBW¥C
agreed not to amend or otherwise alter the terms of the binational agreement
without the concurrence of the Basin States,.. affirming the growing federal-state
commitment to a cooperative approach to Colorado River management.
The two sides then began a marathon of presentations and briefing sessions
476. Id.
477. Id. In the United States, this included representatives from IBWC, Reclamation, a few
key individuals from the Basin States and major water providers, and an NGO representative;
Mexico's representative group consisted of CILA, CONAGUA, and NGOs.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. The composition of this group varied somewhat over time but remained essentially consistent with the group that had put together the initial comprehensive proposals. However, while
US NGOs participated in the majority of the sessions and many of the small technical committees, US NGOs were not permitted to directly participate in the final negotiating sessions on the
basis that only "sovereign" entities should participate in those negotiations. Mexico agreed to the
US-proposed set of rules, although both sides saw a dynamic exchange of ideas between government officials and NGOs to preserve the proper balance and the desired emphasis on certain
issues.
481. For example, small technical committees were formed to work through modeling results
on shortage triggers, to develop a final proposal for investments in canal lining in Mexico to generate water for environmental flows, binational exchange, and similar issues. Id.
482. Id.
483. Memorandum of Agreement on the Implementation of Minute No. 319 (Nov. 20, 2012),
availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organizaion/211966.pdf.
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over a period of several weeks to obtain approvals from the various state agencies, commissions, and water district boards involved in the agreement. 11 With
only one exception-the Imperial Irrigation District"-the parties obtained
these approvals. On November 20, 2012, at a signing ceremony at the Hotel
del Coronado in San Diego, the US and Mexican sections of the IBWC executed Minute 319, "Interim International Cooperative Measures in the Colorado River Basin Through 2017 and Extension of Minute 318 Cooperative
Measures to Address the Continued Effects of the April 2010 Earthquake in
'
the Mexicali Valley, Baja California" ("Minute 319"). 87
D. OVERVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF MINUTE 319
As an appendage to the 1944 Water Treaty, 8 Minute 319 encompasses a
series of agreements, operational measures, and cooperative projects that the
United States and Mexico have agreed to undertake during a five-year period
(the "Pilot Period") that sunsets on December 31, 2017." 9 The intent of Minute
319 is that the agreements, measures, and projects tested during the Pilot Period
will become the foundation for a longer-term agreement that will replace Minute 319."'
At the heart of Minute 319 is a new binational framework for the management of the Colorado River storage reservoirs built around a basic principle of
partnership: that both countries are and should be participants in the management of the shared river resource, and that both countries share responsibility
for that resource."' The binational commitments in Minute 319 also reference
and incorporate the direct cooperation and participation of a series of non-federal government partners in operational measures and projects that will occur
during the Pilot Period, including major US water providers and both US and
Mexican NGOs. "
1. Reservoir Management Provisions (Surpluses, Shortages, and Storage)
As noted above, under the terms of the 1944 Water Treaty the United
States and Mexico share the impacts of shortage "in the same proportion" during times of "extraordinary drought"-an inherently murky standard that created
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486. liD was subsequently written out of key supporting agreements. Farmers and officials in
the Imperial Valley took particular issue with the new proposed emergency interconnection on
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significant uncertainty."' In keeping with a broader theory of partnership, Minute 319 affirms as a basic principle that the United States and Mexico should
share in both the benefits and the burdens of reservoir storage."' I accordance
with this principle, when one country is in shortage, the other should also be in
shortage, and when one country has access to surplus water, so should the other.
Similarly, Mexico and the US Lower Basin water users share the ability to store
conserved water in Lake Mead and deliver that water in a future year on essentially similar terms-for US users, as ICS, for Mexico, as ICMAY
Consistent with the 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines, which reduce deliveries to US users, under Minute 319 water deliveries to Mexico are reduced
during low reservoir conditions, with the volume of reductions tied to reservoir
conditions at Lake Mead (as the primary Lower Basin storage reservoir)49 Under this program, deliveries to Mexico will decrease by progressively larger volumes (in a range of 50,000 to 125,000 acre-feet) as the elevation of Lake Mead
drops below 1,075 feet above mean sea level.'92 Deliveries progressively increase (in a range of 40,000 to 200,000 acre-feet) if the Lake rises above 1,145
feet or when flood releases occur."
Also, in keeping with the partnership principle, Minute 319 continues and
expands the storage framework initially established in Minute 318 by which
Mexico can conserve and store water in the US reservoir system." Under the
ICMA program created in the Minute, Mexico is allowed to store up to 250,000
acre-feet each year of its Treaty allocation in US reservoirs, and to deliver up to
200,000 acre-feet of this stored water each year (this limit corresponds to the
1.7 maf limit on surplus deliveries under the 1944 Water Treaty) ." Mexico
can exercise these powers on terms substantially similar to that available to US
users under the ICS program. Stored ICMA water is subject to a three percent
annual charge for evaporation." ' Additionally, when Mexico stores ICMA, Minute 319 requires that two percent of the stored volume be set aside for environmental uses." The agreement also creates some flexibility in the existing
Minute 242 salinity rules"9 in order to accommodate the creation and delivery
of ICMA while giving Mexico the ability to exercise some control over the salinity of water delivered as part of its treaty allocation through the dedication of
additional saline water to environmental use.'"
Critically, Mexico is also able to use this storage to offset delivery reductions
during shortage conditions."' This was a key provision in the shortage-sharing
agreement because, as noted above, Mexico lacks available domestic on- or
1944 Water Treaty, supra note 29, art. 10(b); Basin States' Letter, supra note 230, at 3.
Minute 319, supra note 25, § I.
495. Id. § III; 2007 INTERIM SHORTAGE GUIDEUNES, supra note 23, at 27.
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off-stream storage that it can use to mitigate shortage impacts. As such, this
provision allows Mexico to make investments in conservation activities upfront
that reduce its use voluntarily in anticipation of future shortages, thus avoiding
the impacts of unpredictable, involuntary reductions. However, Mexico also
agreed to restrict deliveries of ICMA water during shortages as necessary to
protect critical reservoir elevations that could create greater shortages in the
United States 6° From an information-sharing and continued collaboration
standpoint, the two countries also agreed to regular meetings and exchanges of
data, and to monitoring and study of the relationship between reservoir levels
and drought indicators 07in° the Colorado River Basin in order to inform future
management strategies,
2. Delivery of Water to the Colorado River Delta and Restoration Actions
Minute 319 establishes as a basic principle that, to the extent that water
supplies can be identified to provide for it, it is desirable to have water flowing
through the Colorado River limitrophe and Delta ecosystem"'Minute 319 authorizes a series of related activities to be undertaken during the Pilot Period
including (i) the actual delivery of water to the Colorado River Delta based on
a three-way commitment among the United States, Mexico, and NGOs; (ii) joint
US-Mexico monitoring and reporting of the ecological and hydrological results
of those deliveries; and (iii) funding for on-the-ground environmental restoration activities."
To organize the delivery of water to the Delta, Minute 317 required the
Environmental Work Group and Consultative Council to develop and submit
a plan ("Delivery Plan") to the IBWC for the delivery of 195 million cubic meters (mcm) (approximately 158,088 acre-feet) of water to the Colorado River
Delta ecosystem during the Pilot Period." ' To create the Delivery Plan, IBWC
and CILA convened a binational Environmental Flows workgroup that worked
through most of 2013 to prescribe the timing, location, and nature of flows to
be undertaken by the program, as well as strategies for monitoring and reporting
on hydrological and ecological results.'" To assist in this effort, the workgroup
also recruited a team of binational scientific experts recruited from US and
Mexican universities, NGOs, and federal agencies.' The binational Consultative Council, IBWC, and CILA approved the final version of the Delivery Plan
in February 2014.
As part of the water delivery obligations under Minute 319, the United
States and Mexico agreed to arrange for the delivery of approximately 130 mcm
(105,392 acre-feet) of water to the Delta in the form of a "pulse flow." 5 The
water required for the flow derives from storage in Lake Mead developed pursuant to Minute 318, as well as ICMA water developed through conservation
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programs undertaken pursuant to Minute 319."' The Delivery Plan designed
this flow to be a carefully-planned, sequential release of water from Morelos
Dam and two downstream waste-way structures intended to benefit the restoration of native trees throughout the Delta's riparian corridor.
Commencing on March 23, 2014, and concluding on May 18, 2014, the
flow was timed to coincide as precisely as possible with the peak of native cottonwood seed release in the Delta and to conclude before the non-native and
invasive tamarisk seed release reached its peak. 5' To further encourage recruitment of native trees, the flow hydrograph was designed to mimic a natural flood
release that would promote the germination and survival of native cottonwood
and willow seedlings, building rapidly to a high peak flow, and then gradually
lowering over time to allow the roots of newly-germinated trees to chase the
water as it receded until they reached the water table.' 6
Additionally, the Minute provided for the delivery of 52,696 acre-feet (65
mcm, or one-third of the total water delivery) of "base flow" water intended to
benefit restoration sites, to support native vegetation restored by the pulse flow,
and to provide water that would be maintained in portions of the Colorado
River channel during the remainder of the Pilot Period. "" The Delta Water
Trust makes these deliveries."' Operated by a binational coalition of NGOs,
the Trust engaged in a commitment to deliver water rights that it owns or leases
in order to meet the base flow objectives, which it evaluates on an ongoing basis
under the Delivery Plan." ' To support the Trust in this commitment, a number
of NGOs formed a joint fundraising campaign called "Raise the River" that is
intended to help provide a foundation for permanent restoration of water to the
Delta."'
To support and expand ongoing restoration efforts in the Delta, the United
States and Mexico also agreed to finance a series of on-the-ground restoration
efforts at sites throughout the Delta. This included an agreement to undertake
and finance environmental restoration efforts at the binational Miguel Aleman
restoration site, with support from water that the Delta Water Trust would deliver5" In addition, the Minute provided for three million dollars in funding for
additional on-the-ground restoration activities in the Delta!" Restoration activities are planned at various locations along the Colorado River mainstem, starting with a significant expansion of the existing Laguna Grande restoration site.'
Nonprofit groups are also providing significant funding for these activities.
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Finally, in order to allow the two countries to learn from the pilot environmental program, to improve understanding of the Delta ecosystem, and to better plan future agreements for water deliveries to the Colorado River Delta, the
United States and Mexico agreed to undertake joint monitoring and reporting
activities on the hydrological, ecological, and operational results of water deliveries to the Delta during the Pilot Period."' During 2013 the team that developed the Delivery Plan also assisted with the development of a proposed monitoring plan to (i) measure and evaluate surface water, groundwater,
temperature, weather, and water quality conditions during the Pilot Period;
(ii) gather relevant topographic and remote-sensing data; (iii) monitor the response of vegetation and wildlife to the water delivery program; and (iv) record
other critical information."' The United States and Mexico, supplemented by
private nonprofit efforts, have jointly committed funding, equipment, and
in-kind contributions to implement the binational monitoring plan, which is being undertaken by a team of US and Mexican scientists in an extraordinary and
ongoing binational scientific effort.26
3. Conservation Pilot Projects, Binational Water Exchange, and Future
Projects
Finally, Minute 319 creates a framework for joint US and Mexican investment in water conservation infrastructure. " The United States has committed
to provide a total of twenty-one million dollars in funding for infrastructure and
environmental projects in Mexico (including the three million dollars for restoration projects referenced above), which includes ten million dollars provided
by MWD, the SNWA, and the Central Arizona Water Conservation District
("CAWCD"), which operates the CAP."' These parties are providing the ten
million dollars pursuant to a separate funding agreement among the funding
parties and Reclaniationf5
Using these US stakeholder funds and matching Mexican funds, the United
States and Mexico intend to complete a conservation project that will line some
presently unlined portions of the Mexicali Valley delivery systemf 0 Mexico and
the United States will share the benefits of this water conservation. On the US
side, the resulting savings will meet the United States' commitment to provide
52,626 acre-feet of water for environmental purposes in support of the pulse
flow,5 In addition, 124,000 acre-feet of water (derived either from existing Minute 318 storage or from ICMA) will be made available to. the United States as
524.
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binational exchange water."' Ninety-five thousand acre-feet of this exchange
water will be converted into ICS for use by MWD, SNWA, and CAWCD'pursuant to an interlocking series of domestic US agreements signed by Reclamation, the Basin States, and major Lower Basin water providers and contractors
that authorize these exchanges and allow for the conversion of a portion of the
water stored by Mexico to a special category of ICS known as "Binational Intentionally Created Surplus.""' Mexico is then entitled to all remaining water
generated by these conservation activities. 5
As part of Minute 319, the United States and Mexico also agreed to work
towards the establishment of a new emergency backup interconnection between
the two countries to supply Tijuana with water." They have further agreed to
work together on studies and further investigations of additional projects that
could be incorporated into a future Minute, including (i) a regulating reservoir
on the Alamo Canal, (ii) a fallowing program, (iii) additional conservation projects as part of the modernization of Irrigation District 14 in Mexico, (iv) binational desalination plants at Rosarito and the Gulf of California, and (v) opportunities for the beneficial use of water from the New River. 7
E. THE BINATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MINUTE 319

Taken together, the provisions of Minute 319 work to address many areas
of uncertainty under the 1944 Water Treaty and growing water scarcity concerns. Providing clear guidelines for the equitable management of shortages (in
light of the vague provisions of the Treaty), coupled with commitments to share
information and engage in joint study of shortage risks, the two countries have
created a foundation on which they can work together to manage the uncertainties of climate change in the Basin and to share the growing risks of water scarcity. Allowing Mexico to store unused portions of its allocation in Lake Mead,
and to use this water to offset future shortages, has helped reduce overall shortage risk to both countries (by holding reservoir levels higher) and provides Mexico with a mechanism for mitigating the impact of those shortages in the absence
of domestic storage infrastructure. Minute 319's water quality provisions also
create sufficient flexibility within the water quality requirements of Minute 242
to ensure that this storage and delivery will not harm US users, while still honoring the water quality commitments of Minute 242. These provisions also
increase Mexico's control over water quality by allowing it to direct the delivery
of saline water for environmental benefit.
Provisions for joint investments in conservation and the ICMA-ICS exchange mechanism have also created opportunities in both countries. In the
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United States, water users obtain additional water supplies that, although temporary, are critical to short-term flexibility. The Minute facilitates US access to
this water througl exchanges and calls for key US investments that benefit Mexico's efforts to improve domestic infrastructure. Mexican water users are the
long-term beneficiaries of infrastructure investments, as these projects will enable Mexico to better control its own water resources in the future. At the same
time, joint commitments to study additional future projects provide both a basis
and an impetus for continued binational discussion, collaboration, and relations
that will help carry the countries forward into a future, more permanent agreement.
Minute 319's binational environmental flow program also represents an important step towards more holistic consideration of all hydrologic needs in the
basin, human and environmental alike, and a first step towards repairing the
well-documented danage to the Colorado River Delta ecosystem, together with
its wildlife, communities, cultures, and economies. Of equal importance, by
undertaking this program as a deliberate binational investment and experiment
that both demonstrates and tests approaches to environmental restoration, the
Minute is creating and reinforcing ajoint commitment to developing a scientific
understanding of the needs of this shared ecosystem that can inform future binational agreements.
Perhaps most importantly of all, the Minute reflects a commitment to direct
stakeholder engagement that is just one part of a growing commitment to cooperation in the Colorado River Basin. In a watershed where users have long
been renowned for inter- and intrastate conflict, the level of recent cooperation
at the local, state, federal, and now international levels is noteworthy. The active
participation and contribution of agencies, state representatives, and water resource agencies, together with NGOs-none of which are typical participants in
the traditions of formal international diplomacy-has allowed for the development of a unique franework of agreement that is intended to facilitate additional river management innovations in the future. In this respect, the enduring
legacy of Minute 319 in the Colorado River Basin may very well turn out to be
the increased involvement of non-federal stakeholders in the diplomatic process.
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MINUTE 319: LESSONS FOR
OTHER BASINs
"[0necannot be pesslmisticabout the [American] West. Thi is the naive
home ofhope. When it tilly learnsthat cooperation,not riggedindividualism,
is the quality thatmost characterizesandpresenesit, then it w'll have achieved
itselfand oudived its onrins. Then it has a chance to create a society to match
its sceneiy."
- Wallace Stegne?8
Reliable access to freshwater for human health, food production, and other
essentials to survival is fundamental to civilization; access to water also fuels
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economic growth and enables commerce.5 As such, it is unsurprising that there
are a vast number of international agreements concening shared water resources between neighboring societies that extend deep into human history."
An agreement over the sharing of water resources between the Sumerian
city-states of Lagash and Umma, reached in approximately 2500 BCE, is often
cited as the first recorded international treaty of any kind."' More than half of
the world's landmass lies in international river basins,' and at present there are
over one thousand treaties, agreements, and conventions governing the control
and management of fieshwater systems throughout the world.'
Globally, the development of international water law has closely paralleled
the evolution of human societies and the corresponding, intensifying use of
fresh water.5" Before the mid-nineteenth century, most water treaties focused
on promoting the flow of commerce and maintaining the navigability of rivers.5'
However, with the onset of the industrial revolution and the discovery of new
engineering techniques, consumptive uses and other non-navigational issues became the central focus of international water law.'" This phenomenon was parficularly notable in the Colorado River Basin: the 1922 Colorado Compact, the
1944 Water Treaty, and the development of other major governing documents
in the Basin were largely driven by the competition to divert river water to serve
distant, non-navigational uses in agricultural districts and cities.'
As noted in
the Introduction, these and other developments in the Colorado River Basin
have had a lasting impact on how the world views international freshwater management."0
A comparative analysis of existing international water treaties indicates that
for most international river systems, water quality, not water quantity, has been
the most pressing environmental concern assoiated with water development."
However, there is an increasingly visible need for agreements to provide for
environmental flows in the decimated lower reaches of rivers around the
world.' ° Issues related to water scarcity and associated ecosystem degradation
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are already affecting many of the world's important international rivers, including the Ganges, the Indus, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, the Nile, and the
Jordan,55 ' and it appears increasingly likely that many other international river
systems will encounter the challenges of reduced water supplies and radically
altered flows in the face of climate change. The increased supply variability
widely projected to occur with climate change will bring with it not only shortage
risks but also increased likelihood of major flooding, drought, damage to ecosystems, human health concerns, energy supply challenges, and risks to agricultural production."
These issues will present a particular challenge in transboundary river systems,"' where it is often the case that at least one country's water originates from
sources outside its sovereign territory, creating the potential for significant uncertainty, mistrust, and eventual hostility and lack of cooperation in water resource development and management."' Almost universally, unilateral actionespecially in infrastructure development, as the United States' actions in the
Colorado River Basin illustrate-has been a foremost source of tension and a
significant factor in the failure of basin states to negotiate and cooperate."'
Given that sixty percent of the world's river flows are transboundary in nature,
and that there are no existing agreements related to water sharing on roughly
two-thirds of these basins, creating stronger institutional foundations for river
management is immensely important."6
The opportunity to improve water management may be equally significant
on river systems where international water management agreements are already
in place, as many experts have predicted that existing international freshwater
treaties will fail under the pressures of climate change'57 Although most modern
treaties focus on the widely-recognized principle of equitable utilization,55" they
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are also normally relatively static in nature, and often do not include specific
mechanisms designed to facilitate ongoing negotiations and interactions between nations that promote cooperation and benefit sharing, to allow for continuing adaptation, or to encourage the ongoing resolution of differences in the
face of changing conditions.9 In this respect, the United Nations has been critical of the effectiveness of most current international treaties in managing transboundary waterways, asserting that
What is needed are workable monitoring provisions, enforcement mechanisms, and specific water allocation provisions that address variations in water
flow and changing needs.... There is a consensus among experts that international watercourse agreements need to be more concrete, setting out
measures to enforce treaties made and incorporating detailed conflict resolution mechanisms in case disputes erupt. Better cooperation also entails idenfifNing clear yet flexible water allocations and water quality standards, taking
into account hydrological events, changing basin dynamics and societal values.5°

In light of these considerations, many international freshwater management
experts have argued that the necessary features of a sustainable water agreement
include (i) flexibility and allocations that are not written in stone; (ii) agreements
based on an appreciation for the political context, including the cultural, historical, and discursive composition of the states in the basin; (iii) a focus on development opportunities that benefit all riparian states within a basin; and (iv) provisions addressing power. asymmetries." '
One of the greatest strengths of Minute 319 is that it incorporates many of
these features. Minute 319's provisions provide working examples of how both
to improve the functioning of existing agreements in the face of growing resource uncertainty, and to design international water resource agreements in
developing basins that do not yet have comprehensive agreements in place. Beyond its substantive provisions, the process leading to Minute 319 offers valuable lessons on collaboration and the importance of comprehensive stakeholder
inclusion that is likely a necessary element of any healthy river basin management regime.

As the history of Minute 319 suggests, and as we discuss further below,
these features can be traced in no small part to the origins of the agreement in
a strong, locally-driven stakeholder process. In a watershed where water users
have been renowned for past inter- and intrastate conflict," ' the recent and active
participation, cooperation, and contributions of agencies, state representatives,

(last visited Nov. 22, 2014). The 1997 Convention primarily serves to provide guidance for nations in how they lnodify existing or construct new water sharing agreements. Four key prilciples
in the 1997 Convention are: (i) Equitable and reasonable utilization; (ii) no significant harm;
(iii) notification; and (iv) protection, preservation, and management of ecosystems. ZENTNER,
supra note 553, at 14.
559. Press Release, Pacific Inst., Climate Change Will Worsen Water Conflict Across Borders (Jan. 11, 2010); see aiso ZENTNER, suprm note 553, at 1.
560. Tansboundarv Waters, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/
transboundarv _waters.shmi (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).
561. Falkenmark &,Igerskog, supra note 262, at 168.
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NGOs, and water resource agencies-none of which are typical participants in
the traditions of formal international diplomacy-should not be overlooked. By
engaging a broad group of stakeholders in shaping their collective destinies, Minute 319 took a significant step towards overcoming a long historical legacy of
border and water conflict, power asymmetry, and environmental damage in one
of the world's most water-stressed regions."'
A. COMMITMENT TO BENEFIT SHARING

Domestic and international unilateralism, or at best incomplete alliance,
have challenged the Colorado River's development throughout its history. 6 ' It
is perhaps no accident that the greatest advances in cooperation on the River
have been made over the past decade, simply because-as Reclamation's studies
now recognize-the Basin essentially ran out of water resources to develop.' In
other words, "this newfound spirit of cooperation was born of necessity rather
than magnanimity."a' These issues are by no means unique. "International
water lawyers have long recognized that the central problem of too many international rivers has been the unilateral practice of damming and diverting and
then defending the new status quo against down- or upstream objections.' 6'
Ideally, " [d lams land other infrastructure] should be built through cooperation
with all the impacted riparian states, and only after adverse impacts have been
addressed, a mitigation program developed, and a shared management regime
put in place.""'
By recognizing the drawbacks of unilateral action and the benefits of adaptive practices,5" water management approaches over the past fifteen years have
gravitated towards an increasing emphasis on cooperation, negotiated agreements, and the consequent "shanngofbeneits.'. This includes direct benefits
such as water allocation, storage, hydropower and fish production, management
of costs related to flood and drought management, and various indirect benefits
from reduced international tension or increased economic integration."' The
2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines and the Joint Colorado River Cooperative
Process leading to Minute 319 are domestic and international examples, respectively, of this encouraging management trend over the past century.
As the history above suggests, a major reason the United States and Mexico
reached such a broad-based agreement was due to a similar shift in thinking
towards benefit-sharing,' although the explicit recognition of its corollary-that
burdens must also be shared-was equally important. Many aspects of Minute
319 demonstrate commitments to incorporate this benefit and burden-sharing
563.
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principle in water management. For example, the agreement's "partnership"
framework embraces responsibility for resource management and the sharing
of benefits and burdens via clearly defined rules for shortage and surplus allocation and reservoir storage sharing (via the ICMA mechanism), increasing both
the flexibility of Mexico's approach to water management and the reliability of
US Colorado River system reservoirs!"
Similar in intent and result are provisions for increased participation and
control in salinity management in response to altered deliveries, for joint investments mechanisms in system efficiency and binational water exchange, and for
investigation of a broad range of potential conservation, augmentation, and system operation projects."' Perhaps most importantly, the commitment to lay the
groundwork for longer-term environmental protection via a binational environmental flow demonstration project, joint monitoring and science, and investments in restoration of Delta resources demonstrates significant movement in
this direction.
B. AJOINT COMMITMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP
As the Colorado River Delta also so vividly illustrates, the failure to consider
ecological interests in a river basin can have substantial adverse economic, social, cultural, and ecological effects on local comnmnities, as well as on basin
ecosystems as a whole. Internationally, as one commentator noted, "[flour categories of environmental change result in potential transboundary problems:
degradation (pollution), scarcity (shortage), maldistribution (inequitable access)
and disaster." ' ' The Colorado River Delta has experienced all four problems
extensively, especially degradation and scarcity. Past failures to account for ecosystem needs as part of binational water management decuiated the Colorado
River Delta and significantly contributed to a strained relationship between the
United States and Mexico."'6 Conversely, facing crisis and the need to address
the management of the resource jointly played an extremely important role in
developing the collaboration framework that led to substantive results in Minute
319.
Although the ecological consequences of water development on the Colorado River Delta may well have been extreme, they are by no means unique.
Throughout the world, "more river basins are moving towards being 'closed,'
that is to a situation when there is no more water to allocate."" ' However, few,
if any, international water treaties have focused explicitly on the substantial environmental consequences of water development."' Some international agreements and conventions have identified environmental protection and restoration as important goals," ' and there has been a significant amount of academic
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ink spilled on ecosystem and environmental services protection benefits. However, Minute 319 appears to be the first international agreement to allocate a
specific amount of water to provide an environmental benefit. "'
For example, Europe's Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes-one of the most comprehensive international water agreements in the world-provides a regional framework
for European states to collaborate for responsible management of transboundary surface water and groundwater throughout Europe. " ' It specifically deals
with monitoring, research and development, exchange of information, consultations, warning and alarm systems, and mutual assistance, as well as access to
information by the public, but does not squarely address water availability for
environmental purposes."' No major European water resource agreement has
allocated water for environmental benefit.8
As early as 1909, the United States and Canada reached freshwater agree-

ments on shared resources; the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 is a major
component of the US-Canada relationship and provides equal access to citizens

of both states to "all navigable boundary waters" shared by the two nations. ",
However, neither the 1909 agreement nor any other water resource agreement
between the United States and Canada dedicates water for environmental purSouth American freshwater resource agreements have also lacked
poses?
commitments to environmental water restoration and/or mitigation. One ex-

ample is the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (among Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Columbia, Peru, Suriname, and Guyana),"'6 which establishes a cooperation framework among its signatories and emphasizes "preservation of the
environment, and the conservation and rational utilization of the natural resources" as a core concern, but does not address the availability of water for
environmental purposes? 7 Likewise, the Protocol of Amendment for the Creation of the Organization of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty (OTCA), "' the
580. See Chandler Clay, U.S. andMexico to Send Water into ParchedColorado River Delta,
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Switz.-It., Apr. 20, 1972 (intended to protect various shared freshwater lakes and waterways from
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Agreement on Parandi River Projects, 5"and the Statute of the River Uruguay'
are silent on these issues.
Comparable Asian freshwater resource agreements include the Ganges
Water-Sharing Treaty" ' and the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin'" African freshwater resource
agreements include the Nile Waters Treaty of 1959." and its corresponding
Nile Basin Cooperative Framework,"9 ' which Egypt and Sudan have not
signed.' Notably, the Cooperative Framework obliges its signatories "to protect, conserve and, where necessary, rehabilitate the Nile River Basin and its
ecosystems... [by] protecting and improving water quality within the Nile River
Basin," 96 but it does not specifically address water availability for environmental
uses.
As these examples suggest, although there are numerous examples in international water law where countries have allocated freshwater resources, to the
extent that these agreements have embraced environmental concerns, they have
typically focused on water quality protection, and not on actual water availability

589. In 1979 the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay formally agreed to begin a
series of hydroelectric dam projects on the Panard River chiefly concerned with the construction
of a large dam and hydroelectric power plant at Itaipi. The Panar. Agreement set flow parameters for the river leaving the Itaipii dam, as well as committing its signatories to "preserve the
environment" by avoiding contamination of the Panard River. The agreement also called for "creation of new national parks and the improvement of existing parks" as part of the broader strategy
for environmental preservation. Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay: Agreement on ParanA River Projects,
Oct. 19, 1979.
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preserve the aquatic environment and, in particular, to prevent its pollution, by prescribing appropriate rulesFalse" Statute of the River Uruguay, Uru.-Arg., art. 41(a), Feb. 26, 1975.
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resources, aquatic life and conditions, and ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin from
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for ecosystem needs. At least in this respect, Minute 319's defined water quantity dedicated to environmental restoration-even if on a temporary basis-appears to be unique. Minute 319 also appears to be the first example of a cooperative, binational experiment to assess the binational environmental resource
restoration potential. "This integration of human and ecosystem goals in an
international agreement can become a model for international environmental
policy.".9 As one US official noted, the agreement embodied in Minute 319
"demonstrates that even in an over-allocated river system, water supplies can be
found to secure or expand instream flows."5. "It is a success story not just for
the Colorado River, but for all other ecosystems looking to make a comeback."5
As the Delta history related above suggests, this result would not have been
possible in the absence of binational collaboration and a collective willingness
to move beyond the status quo. The joint commitment to providing tangible
environmental flows in the Delta reflected in Minutes 316 and 319-as well as
in the binational partnership to plan, study, and report on the saine-was extremely important in Mexico.' As a general matter, Mexico's central government demonstrated that it supports and prioritizes river restoration, as it "conceded federal land for restoration purposes that will ensure that water
purchased for conservation is used for that purpose.""° But Mexico has historically lacked the capacity to deal with jointly-caused environmental issues in the
Delta on its own."' In this regard, the Delta has long stood as a stark reminder
of an inherently asymmetrical border relationship."3
By building a narrative around the Colorado River Delta restoration that
focused on future proactive joint management opportumiesinstead of casting
blamne for the results of past power struggles, Minute 319 took an important step
towards defusing the ongoing local, regional, and national tension surrounding
the loss of the Delta resource. In this sense, the environmental program reflected in Minute 319 also provides a framework within which the two nations
can talk about longer-term solutions to the difficult challenges they face. By
focusing on what the two countries can accomplish together-through funding
of expanded restoration efforts in the Colorado River Delta, through a commitment to the joint plan development for environmental water deliveries, and
through the development and funding of a joint environmental monitoring and
science effort to study, evaluate, and report on the results-the environmental
flow program provides a basis for continued and expanded cooperation in future agreements. At the same time, the program's success and the growing public attention paid to it 04 create an imperative for stakeholders to continue to
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cooperate to find proactive solutions to avoid a regression back to tie adversarial relationship on the Colorado River.'°
C. THE CRITICAL LINK BETWEEN FLEXIBILITY AND SPECIFICITY
Ingeneral, transboundary water agreements indeveloped basins often lack
the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions.'
Existing international water
sharing treaties are usually static and seldom account for climate and flow variability within the basin."7 This is an especially troubling problem insofar as climate change is likely to exacerbate seasonal and annual flow variations, creating
more volatile conditions that stress these brittle systems. " Flexibility-"the ability to implement changes to an agreement to better manage changes in the water
flow/availability or in the existing political framework"-is key to an international
institution's ability to deal with environmental issues.'
Although on its face this need for flexibility would seem to call for incorporating less, not more, detail into international agreements, the historical USMexico relationship over the Colorado River points to a key, if counterintuitive,
lesson. That is that, at least in the transboundary context, ambiguous treaty
provisions can have the unintended effect of creating rigidity and can actually
undermine water agreements' flexibility. Such intentionally ambiguous, difficult-to-enforce language can be a weakness of international freshwater treaties.6 '
By contrast, clearly defined and specific treaty provisions that provide both sides
with a clear. understanding of an agreement's provisions help to reduce uncertainty.6 ' Specificity, in this context, refers to "how detailed and exact the institutional framnework is," and often times relates closely to a treaty's enforceability.612
Without precise rules or procedures, the relationship between basin countries can suffer due to multiple interpretations of unspecific provisions, undermining agreement enforceability." ' As noted in the history of the US-Mexico
relationship on the Colorado River, the 1944 Water Treaty's ambiguous language with regard to "extraordinary drought" was the source of significant uncertainty that motivated the United States and Mexico to develop more specific
agreements on voluntary shortage-sharing in Minute 319.6'
Minute 319's focus on clearly defined voluntary obligations for additional
water deliveries or reductions in deliveries-each based on verifiable, objective
conditions-avoided conflict concerning the parties' various and conflicting interpretations of the 1944 Water Treaty's ambiguous language, thereby alleviating the problematic uncertainty that resulted from this language and making the
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water management framework more enforceable. This also served as a conflict
resolution mechanism, as the Minute adopted these solutions as part of a voluntary program overlaying the provisions of the Treaty (rather than purporting
to interpret it). By so doing, the Minute allowed the parties to preserve their
legal positions with regard to the language interpretation of the Treaty itself,
while sidestepping theneed to resolve those conflicts in advance of more effective collaboration on binational river management.
D. EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION AND JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF
INFORMATION

Many commentators have noted the central importance of providing for
effective communication and coordination in the international water agreement
context. Failing to provide for effective communication and coordination between international basin states can impede the development of clear and precise guidelines, which obstructs flexibility and adaptability and makes identifying
proactive, win-win solutions more difficult. " ' However, many water management frameworks emphasize the centralized control of water resources, which
can substantially limit multi-level communication opportunities and the flow of
information between two countries."'
This tendency was obvious throughout the history of the US-Mexico Colorado River relationship. With IBWC and CILA serving as the primary gatekeepers for communication on water issues, the countries became locked in a
spiraling series of communication failures around the 2001 Guidelines, the AllAmerican Canal lining, and other issues once that relationship broke down. By
contrast, multi-level communication at the local, national, and international
level can "allow[] policymakers to quickly respond to what are often dynamic
and highly variable end-user requirements. "...
In particular, Minute 319 emphasizes the importance of facilitating the development of informal, information-sharing relationships among binational actors. The gradual development of understanding and trust-and eventually,
friendship-among US and Mexican interests through repeated meetings, workshops, field trips, and less formal interactions was critical to reaching a comprehensive international agreement. Improved communication can also serve to
reduce tensions resulting from inevitable inequalities and unilateral actions,
whether real or merely perceived,6" as well as to establish a mutual understanding of the underlying interests and values of each basin state."' In this respect,
some experts have observed that using a third party facilitator can greatly enhance communication by diminishing outside political influences and helping
to maintain trust and focus. 'N
Minute 319 and the process leading to its adoption also points to the importance of jointly developing information so as to improve binational communication. As described in Section V above, before the two countries reached an
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understanding on a common modeling platform, it was nearly impossible for
them to reach agreement on the policies and strategies for river management.
Joint assessment of shortage triggers, joint investigation of potential future projects, joint development of the Delta environmental flow program, and joint
investigation and monitoring of the hydrological and biological outcomes of that
program are all key features of the Minute will that drive continued binational
cooperation.
Joint development of information relevant to water management issues,
such as joint environmental monitoring, can also improve flexibility by providing a politically neutral platform for negotiation and cooperation on controversial issues."' This information-sharing ensures that agreements are built upon
the best scientific knowledge available instead of political considerations that
may result in unworkable tradeoffs that are not well understood."' Implementing management approaches that "focus[] on learning and adapting, through
partnerships of managers, scientists, and other stakeholders who learn together
how to create and maintain sustainable ecosystems"" can help water managers
move past traditional arms-length approaches to water management and improve institutional cooperation.
E. BRINGING STAKEHOLDERS TO DIPLOMACY: LAYING THE
GROUNDWORK FOR COOPERATION
The importance of increased communication and collaboration in both developed and developing basins is probably self-evident. However, the Minute
319 process revealed several important lessons that other international basins,
both developed and developing, might apply to their own experiences.
First, as the deteriorating relationship between the United States and Mexico throughout the early 2000s demonstrated, the existence of a formal, centralized framework for collaboration is by no means a precondition to commencing
binational cooperation, even if ultimately a binational agency or facilitator is
needed to bring about a result."' In the absence of such a framework, initial
efforts can begin with short-term, ground-level projects that involve local stakeholders and build binational trust.Y On-the-ground efforts can be particularly
effective in creating initial collaboration by providing tangible results that build
trust, mutual understanding, and a history of shared success; the binational efforts that proved restoration in the Delta was possible are one useful example.
In the case of Minute 319, it was the efforts of a small group of NGOs, US
and Mexican water agencies and managers, and other interested parties whose
initial discussions broke through a long-standing stalemate on a variety of water
management issues and laid the groundwork for a formal binational discussion,
which in turn laid the groundwork for a formal binational negotiation."' As this
process developed, it of course relied upon the IBWC as the formal facilitator;
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however, the Treaty's formal structures may well have initially inhibited collaboration between stakeholders across the border since each side could simply
place pressure upon the IBWC to advance its own interests at the other side's
expense. It was only after this domestically-driven, unilateral approach that led
to a series of controversial actions and a deteriorating relationship among
IBWC and CILA-a development that the River's stakeholders understood to
be antithetical to their own interests in light of growing river management challenges-that the stakeholders had an incentive to cooperate with each other.
Second, it is never too soon to begin the process.7' Patiently developed
collaboration is built upon relationships between individuals; those relationships may be far more important to reaching an agreement than the substance
of the agreement. As noted above, a healthy dose of "cerveza, camaraderie,
and good company" was a key ingredient of Minute 319; the relationships that
ultimately led to information-sharing, the bridging of cultural and language gaps,
and the understandings reached had complex roots that built upon a decade of
informal communications between scientists, NGOs, community leaders, and
water managers-not just upon the formal diplomatic ties of two nations.
Third, bringing a diverse group of local interests to the table can make a
different kind of agreement possible. It was precisely the ground-up process
used to reach Minute 319-and Minutes 316, 317, and 318 before it-that provided the means of reaching a comprehensive and creative agreement. Many
provisions of the agreement could never have been conceptualized, proposed,
or undertaken without the involvement of the Basin States and major municipal
water providers like SNWA, MWD, and CAWCD. In light of the extraordinary sensitivity surrounding the US basin states' and individual providers' Colorado River water allocations, it is unlikely that the US section of IBWC would
have been afforded the political leeway to discuss issues that potentially affected
those allocations. These sensitive issues include the sharing of US reservoir
storage via ICMA, binational water exchanges, surplus sharing, allowing the use
of ICMA to offset shortage-related reductions in water deliveries, and funding
of conservation and restoration projects. Similar political sensitivities would
have imposed the same constraints on CILA in Mexico. The cooperative,
multi-leveled, and stakeholder-driven approach that led to the JCRCP was the
foundation for Minute 319 and its innovative provisions.
In this last respect, one particularly interesting feature of Minute 319 was
the role played by a binational network of US and Mexican NGOs. Building
from more than a decade of experience in binational collaboration, NGOs
played a pivotal yet unusual role in drawing attention to the Colorado River
Delta by starting dialogue and negotiations to bridge the gap between the two
countries." As detailed in the history above, NGOs helped to overcome enormous obstacles associated with the general binational ignorance of the Delta,
paucity of scientific information, persistent language and cultural barriers, lack
of international communication, and an inadequate legal framework. The
NGOs did so through a flexible, adaptive strategy that built local support and
interest in Delta restoration through local demonstration sites and science efforts; these successes changed the posture of NGOs vis-hi-vis traditional water
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users and improved transboundary cooperation and communication by exploring a broad range of options that sought to address environmental needs as part
of a broader water management solution on the border.'
The rising influence of NGO stakeholders is a relatively recent trend in
international environmental and water law." Minute 319 (and the 2007 Shortage Guidelines and JCRCP that preceded it) represented a particularly significant evolution for NGOs in the Colorado River Basin, which has had a long
history of arms-length relationships between NGOs and traditional -water user
interests; in the past, litigation was a far more common tool to drive change than
collaboration." US environmental NGOs and water users began the 2000s far
apart in their interests and objectives, as evidenced by the deep divisions caused
by the 2001 Interim Surplus Guidelines and ESA litigation. They ended the
2000s working together, for the most part, to bring about both the 2007 Shortage Guidelines and Minutes 316, 317, 318, and 319-an essentially unprecedented level of collaboration among traditionally divided interests.
Although NGOs were not included in all of the negotiating sessions-some
were conducted on a purely sovereign-to-sovereign basis (or at least nearly so)NGOs participated throughout the process in a manner that is nearly unprecedented in the Colorado River Basin, sitting "at the table" for much of the process and chairing or co-chairing many of the relevant working groups." Perhaps
even more importantly, NGOs have helped to implement Minute 319 by
providing many resources necessary for its implementation. NGOs and their
retained experts have participated in most facets of the agreement implementation-not just in the more traditional role of scientific support, but also through
the Colorado River Delta Water Trust, which has been an explicit participant
in the planning and provision of environmental flows to the Delta.
Ten years ago, when NGOs with interests in the Delta began to focus on
acquiring water rights for transfer to environmental flows, one prominent water
law expert described their restoration efforts as "a creative second best compared to a binational cooperative, adaptive management regime.""4 While this
assessment of the importance of future binational adaptive management was
undoubtedly correct, what this description overlooked was that these efforts
were laying the foundation for binational cooperation in Minute 319-an agreement that is positioned to become a leading, if not preeminent, exanple of
adaptive management in international river basins. As such, this "creative second best" has proved to be the catalyst for a binational adaptive management
regime-illustrating that, at least in this context of a complex and entrenched
system of water management, sustained ground-level efforts that demonstrate
creative solutions can be an effective means of gaining recognition and driving
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larger-scale .change.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF COOPERATION AND THE

CHALLENGES AHEAD
At 8:00 a.m. local time on March 23, 2014, a large group of federal water
managers, US and Mexican water users, NGOs, media, and local Mexican and
US residents gathered at Morelos Dam to watch as the gates opened on the
historic Delta "pulse flow." Cheers went up as water began rushing through the
dam; champagne was poured, and the Colorado River began a fifty-three-day
journey through the dry reaches of its former Delta, flooding vast stretches of
dry and damaged Delta habitat, finally reaching the Gulf of California on May
15, 2014." The event, which received broad media coverage in both the United
States and Mexico, featured a joint celebration on the morning the flow reached
its peak, during which numerous dignitaries proclaimed the renewed spirit of
binational cooperation and its benefits.
Perhaps the most poignant moments of the pulse flow, however, occurred
during a spontaneous, multi-week beach party in the Mexican town of San Luis
Rio Colorado- whose residents had not seen a flowing River for decades--complete with mariachi bands, dancing horses, came asada cookouts, and children
splashing in the water.' And few who witnessed it will forget the experience of
watching the River make its slow, inexorable way across the remnants of its barren Delta to the sea, and the amazingly rapid, if fleeting, return of birds, fish,
beavers, otters, and other wildlife to the dry channel.
Without diminishing the importance of the binational achievement in
reaching Minute 319, there is a long road ahead for the United States and Mexico as each country moves to implement, learn from, and ultimately replace
Minute 319. This will, of course, include ongoing conflicts over international
water use that could erode the spirit of local goodwill and cooperation. Perhaps
more significantly, the US-Mexico relationship on the Rio Grande, where disagreements over Mexico's delivery obligations have become an ongoing source
of conflict, 3 ' have repeatedly threatened to spill over into the Colorado River
Basin.
Perhaps the most significant test of Minute 319, however, is likely to come
from the extraordinary hydrology of the River itself. Less than a year after the
international agreement, Reclamation's twenty-four month study revealed that
Lake Powell would reduce releases to Lake Mead for the first time in history,'8
and more recent modeling from Reclamation shows a high likelihood of the
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first-ever shortages on the Colorado River within just a few years." Given its
temporary nature, Minute 319's ability to endure will likely depend heavily on
continued stakeholder commitment to binational cooperation in the face of adversity and potentially worsening conditions.' One US official called Minute
319 "a good way to open the door" to those future conversations."
Although driven by the ongoing drought, these current conditions may well
provide a preview of conditions that will become commonplace in the Basin's
future. Reclamation's 2012 Basin Study, the product of more than two years of
collaboration among federal and state agencies, Indian tribes, NGOs, and scientists, provided a comprehensive analysis of river system supply and demand
looking forward into the River's future.' The Basin Study evaluated a variety
of potential future scenarios for the growth in demand and water supply availability to meet those demands, including scenarios built from the leading global
climate models." This study demonstrated that water users on the Colorado
River face significant projected imbalances in future supply and demand-imbalances that could grow to an annual average of around 3.2 million acre-feet
over the next five decades (approximately twenty percent of current Basin-wide
demands)." ' Worst-case scenarios suggest potential imbalances reaching as
much as fifty percent of current demands.'
More importantly, the 2012 Basin Study also indicated that the Colorado
River's human and environmental users inevitably face growing risks of water
supply shortages, reservoir declines, and critical reductions in stream flows that
cannot be completely controlled or avoided. " As a result, the Basin's water
users must plan for, and work together to manage, the impacts of extreme conditions not previously seen or experienced in historical memory. This will require new flexibility in water management and the ability to adapt a historically
rigid water distribution system to accommodate inevitable disruption."2
This issue is by no means unique to the Colorado River basin. Population
growth, politics, economic issues, social evolution, and climate change, together
with other landscape and seasonal changes, create real problems for water managers around the world. Typically, nations have built water management institutions to control natural variability and impose stability on water supplies to
support economic growth." In the face of uncertainty and the potential for
conditions that fall outside of managers' historical experience, however, these
water supply systems-which lie at the heart of our social, economic, and political order and civilization-are likely to prove more fragile and prone to failure
than we have planned them to be. Locally, domestically, and internationally,
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this could have major consequences in many parts of the world, and the management of this kind of uncertainty will demand strong institutions that are able
to respond to challenges flexibly.
Whether other international river basins can act with more initial success.
and prudence in water resource development remains to be seen; internationally, the "project of constraining unilateral action can at best be descibed as a
very limited success ... as China, India, and Turkey continue to engage in large
multipurpose water projects unilaterally."' Given water's significance to municipal, agricultural, and industrial development and the economic destiny of
cities, regions, and nations, this is perhaps inevitable. However, as countries
such as Brazil, China, and India follow the traditional models of "big dana development" and more stories like the Colorado River Delta illuminate the "social, equitable,*environmental, and economic costs of [large scale infrastructure
development]," it can be hoped that more countries will seize the opportunit
to build foundations for strong communication and benefit-sharing into international agreements."
While Minute 319's substantive provisionsare likely to evolve as new information and basin conditions emerge, we contend that Minute 319's real legacy
is likely to be less the substance of its provisions than the framework for cooperation it created. Inclusiveness and "stakeholder participation [are] widely considered 11key prerequisitels] for adaptive and integrated water resources management" in the international context."' As we have argued, the key to Minute
319's success in putting together a comprehensive package of innovative enviromnental, conservation, and water sharing provisions was the broad engagement of stakeholders on both sides of the border within a collaborative process
that pushed both sides towards agreement. This process unified states, federal
water contractors, and NGOs representing a range of local interests who have
all traditionally operated with a narrower vision. Minute 319 "is a breakthrough
in communication about and understanding
of the interrelated importance of
2
Colorado River water to both nations."
This direct stakeholder involvement was particularly important in light of
the history of arms-length interactions that led to ongoing conflict in the border
water relationship, a growing disconnect between local and national priorities
and needs, and substantial mistrust and lack of understanding that had made
collaboration through usual diplomatic channels more difficult. This groundup process of negotiation, facilitated and guided by the diplomatic corps of both
nations, but to an important extent led and initiated by the Basin's major water
stakeholders themselves, could provide a potential model for building trust and
managing emerging conflicts over resource scarcity in other arid and semi-arid
regions.
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